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Introduction
Benjamin Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree murder while vocally
maintaining during the plea colloquy—in his native Spanish tongue—that he
acted in self-defense.
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, and has a fifth-grade
education. In 2010, Mr. Arriaga shot Benacio Herrera after the two struggled over
a gun. The State charged Mr. Arraiga with first-degree murder and two seconddegree felonies. The State and Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel negotiated a plea deal
where Mr. Arriaga would plead guilty only to the first-degree murder charge.
Prior to the plea hearing, trial counsel met with Mr. Arriaga privately about
the plea deal. But English-speaking trial counsel did not speak Spanish, and
Spanish-speaking Mr. Arriaga did not speak English except for a few random
words. Mr. Arriaga left that meeting believing he had to plead guilty.
During the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga twice asserted that he acted in selfdefense. Neither the district court nor trial counsel explained to Mr. Arriaga the
impact of his self-defense claim on his first-degree murder plea. Rather, the plea
colloquy soldiered onward, and the district court accepted Mr. Arriaga’s guilty
plea to murder.
After his sentencing, Mr. Arriaga petitioned for postconviction relief. He
asserted that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, and he argued that trial
counsel was ineffective for not having an interpreter present in the meeting
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before the plea hearing. The State moved for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga’s
petition, and the district court granted that motion.
Mr. Arriaga then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, making the same
arguments. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. This Court
then granted certiorari on the question of whether the Utah Court of Appeals
improperly affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction relief petition.

Issue Presented
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the district court’s denial
of Mr. Arriaga’s petition for postconviction relief, when (1) the court held that Mr.
Arriaga’s plea to first-degree murder was knowing and voluntary despite Mr.
Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy and (2) Mr. Arriaga’s
English-speaking trial counsel did not have a Spanish-speaking interpreter
during their meeting to explain the plea?
Standard of review: The district court dismissed Mr. Arriaga’s
postconviction petition on summary judgment. In reviewing that ruling, the
Court of Appeals “viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and reviewed the court’s legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness.”
Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., 2016 UT 7, ¶ 11, 367 P.3d 1006 (quotation
omitted and cleaned up).
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“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on
appeal presents a question of law that [an appellate court] review[s] for
correctness.” State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 18, 424 P.3d 845 (quotation omitted
and cleaned up).
“On a writ of certiorari, [the Supreme Court] review[s] the decision of
the Court of Appeals . . . and appl[ies] the same standard of review used by
the Court of Appeals. [The Supreme Court] conduct[s] that review for
correctness, ceding no deference to the Court of Appeals.” State v. Wilder, 2018
UT 17, ¶ 15, 420 P.3d 1064 (cleaned up).
Preservation: Mr. Arriaga argued in the district court and in the Court of
Appeals that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to have an interpreter present at their meeting. (R. 1108–12,
1117–18, 1323–41.)
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Statement of the Case
1.

Mr. Arriaga Shoots Mr. Herrera During a Struggle 1
In 2010, Mr. Arriaga became distraught and angry after discovering that

Benacio Herrera had an affair with his wife. (R. 105, 166, 176, 213–14.) 2 Mr.
Arriaga confronted Mr. Herrera about the affair. (R. 167, 228.) The two
exchanged punches. (R. 167.) Then Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband,
intending to scare Mr. Herrera but not shoot. (R. 228.) Mr. Herrera asked Mr.
Arriaga to forgive him, and Mr. Arriaga said that “this kind of thing is not
forgiven.” (R. 694.) Mr. Herrera lunged at Mr. Arriaga and tried to grab the gun.
(R. 167, 228.) The gun went off, and Mr. Herrera was shot five times—twice in
front, twice in the back, and once in the back of his head. (R. 141.)
2.

Mr. Arriaga Meets with Trial Counsel about a Plea
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with first-degree murder and two other

second-degree felonies. (R. 61, 77.)
The district court found Mr. Arriaga indigent and appointed him counsel.
(Add. D, Docket in State v. Arriaga, No. 101400853, at 3.) Trial counsel litigated
Because the district court dismissed Mr. Arriaga’s petition on summary
judgment after a partial evidentiary hearing, the facts below are recited in the
light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga. See Judge, 2016 UT 7, ¶ 11. The evidentiary
hearing in this case was not completed (and consequently did not include
testimony about the issues raised in this appeal), so the facts are drawn from Mr.
Arriaga’s postconviction petition, evidence submitted with the parties’ filings, and
relevant material from the evidentiary hearing.
1

Although they were still married, Mr. Arriaga was separated from his wife
at the time the affair occurred. (R. 200.)
2
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a preliminary hearing and a failed motion to suppress. (Add. D at 7, 14.) In an
April 2011 hearing, trial counsel informed the court that the matter would be
resolved by Mr. Arriaga pleading guilty to first-degree murder. (R. 410.)
Immediately prior to that hearing, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel.
(Add. C, R. 1178.)
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, and has a fifth-grade
education. (R. 1339–40.) At the time of the shooting, Mr. Arriaga did not speak
English except for a few random words. (Add. C, R. 1177.) English-speaking trial
counsel did not speak Spanish. (Id.)
Even though trial counsel and Mr. Arriaga had a language barrier, trial
counsel did not have a Spanish-speaking interpreter present during their
meeting. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Because no interpreter was present at that
meeting, Mr. Arriaga believed trial counsel told him he had already been found
guilty and that he had to plead guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177.) Mr. Arriaga did
not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent until
proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) Had Mr. Arriaga known that he did not have to
plead guilty, he would not have pleaded guilty and would instead have insisted on
going to trial. (Add. C, R. 1179.)
3.

Mr. Arriaga Pleads Guilty to First-Degree Murder Maintaining
Self-Defense
After meeting with trial counsel, Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing.

When he walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit that was written in
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Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Add. C, R. 1178.) And during
the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from trial
counsel—that he had to plead guilty that day. (Id.)
At the plea hearing, an interpreter translated for Mr. Arriaga. (R. 78.) The
district court informed Mr. Arriaga of his rights and then asked for a factual
basis:
THE COURT:

Okay. Counsel, can you give me a
factual basis?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in
Salt Lake County Mr. ArriagaLuna confronted a man who had
been sleeping with his wife. An
argument and subsequent fight
took place at which time he pulled
out a firearm and he shot the
man[,] killing him.
THE COURT:

Is that what
Arriaga-Luna?

happened,

Mr.

THE DEFENDANT: I defended myself. It was not my
intention. I never thought about
hurting him.
THE COURT:

Okay. Does that change the plea at
all, counsel?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we had—we had
discussed the imperfect selfdefense concept and that he did
pull out a gun to get the man to
confess to his sleeping with his
wife. And that the man charged at
him but was unarmed. So that is
why he used a gun.
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THE COURT:

I will find that that is a sufficient
factual basis.

THE DEFENDANT: He was drugged and drunk and I
didn’t know if he had a weapon, a
knife and that’s why I . . . .
THE COURT:

Okay. . . . Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you
understand that by pulling the
trigger you knew you could cause
the death of the gentleman?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay. Thank you. I will accept that
factual
basis.
Has
anyone
threatened you or forced you to
enter this plea today?

THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

Has anyone made any promises to
you?

THE DEFENDANT: No, not [inaudible].
THE COURT:

Thank you. . . . Mr. Arriaga-Luna,
then to the charge of murder, a
first-degree felony, how do you
plead, guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
(Add. B, R. 413–15.)
The district court accepted Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea and sentenced him.
(Add. B., R. 415–16.)
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4.

Mr. Arriaga Petitions for Postconviction Relief
After he was sentenced, Mr. Arriaga timely petitioned for postconviction

relief. (R. 77, 1263.) In the petition, Mr. Arriaga asserted, among other things,
that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to communicate with Mr. Arriaga in Spanish about his plea.
(R. 1263–64.) 3 He supported his petition with an affidavit, where Mr. Arriaga
described the meeting with trial counsel before the plea hearing and the language
barrier between the two. (Add. C, R. 1176–80.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (R. 443,
505.) The court received the testimony of the prosecutor; however, it only heard
some testimony from trial counsel because it suspended the hearing to allow Mr.
Arriaga to file an amended petition to add an allegation not relevant to this
appeal. (R. 548–49.)
Before the district court set another evidentiary hearing, the State moved
for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga’s entire amended petition. (R. 552–53,
1320–21.) The district court granted the motion.
In granting the motion, the district court held that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was
knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was not ineffective. (Add. A, R.
1220.) It held that Mr. Arriaga had “not shown that he should not be bound by
Mr. Arriaga originally filed a petition pro se. (R. 1.) The district court then
appointed counsel, and the appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R. 65.)
The original counsel withdrew, and the district court appointed new counsel, who
filed a second amended petition. (R. 445.) The State moved for summary
judgment on the second amended petition. (R. 566.)
3
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the representations he made during the change-of-plea colloquy” and had “not
shown that he could not adequately understand his counsel’s advice about the
guilty plea.” (Add. A, R. 1269.) The court also held, “Even if Mr. Arriaga
misunderstood his counsel’s advice in relation to the guilty plea, any
misunderstanding was cured by the Court’s plea colloquy and the Plea
Statement,” so as a matter of law “Mr. Arriaga ha[d] not shown that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary.” (Add. A, R. 1270.)
5.

The Court of Appeals Affirms the Dismissal of the
Postconviction Petition
Mr. Arriaga appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. He raised two issues.

First, he argued that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary; twice during
the plea colloquy he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element
of the murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand
the plea. Second, he argued that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel; trial counsel should have had an interpreter present at the
meeting before the plea, because trial counsel and Mr. Arriaga had a significant
language barrier. Because of that language barrier, Mr. Arriaga misunderstood
the necessity of entering a plea.
In an opinion, two judges on the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Arriaga’s
plea was knowing and voluntary because nothing in the record suggested that Mr.
Arriaga lacked an understanding of the elements of murder. Arriaga v. State,
2018 UT App 160, ¶ 15. One judge—Judge Pohlman—concurred in the result.
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Judge Pohlman expressed doubt about whether the district court adequately
resolved Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy. Id. ¶ 25.
But she ultimately concurred in the result because she concluded that Mr. Arriaga
was not prejudiced. Id. ¶ 27. All three judges agreed that Mr. Arriaga did not
show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to have an interpreter during
their meeting before the plea hearing. Id. ¶ 20.
Mr. Arriaga filed a petition for certiorari. This Court granted that petition
on the question of “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the postconviction court’s denial of [Mr. Arriaga’s] petition for post-conviction relief.”

Summary of the Argument
Mr. Arriaga challenged his guilty plea under the Postconviction Remedies
Act, which allows a court to vacate a guilty plea if the plea was not knowing or
voluntary or if the plea was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court
of Appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction
petition.
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice during the
plea colloquy he asserted self-defense, which negated an essential element of the
murder plea and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the plea.
And looking beyond the record of the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga produced
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evidence that the language barrier between him and trial counsel prevented him
from understanding the plea.
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was also the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel. English-speaking trial counsel spoke no Spanish, and Mr. Arriaga is a
native Spanish speaker who spoke almost no English. Right before the plea
colloquy, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel without an interpreter. After that
meeting, Mr. Arriaga believed trial counsel told him that he had to plead guilty.
He would not have entered his plea had he not believed trial counsel told him he
had to.
Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary, and his plea was a result
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed
the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction petition on summary judgment.
Argument
The Court of Appeals incorrectly affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Mr. Arriaga’s petition for postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals erred when
it concluded that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was (1) knowing and voluntary and (2)
not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga will take each
argument in turn.
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1.

Mr. Arriaga’s Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary
Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree murder while vocally

maintaining—in his native tongue—that he acted in self-defense. But a selfdefense claim belies a first-degree murder plea. Neither the district court nor the
attorneys adequately resolved the contradiction.
Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense statements rendered his plea not knowing or
voluntary, and thus subject to challenge under the Postconviction Remedies Act.
Under that act, a defendant may challenge his conviction if it was obtained in
violation of the United States Constitution. Utah Code § 78B-9-104(1)(a). A guilty
plea is valid under the United States Constitution if “it is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16,
279 P.3d 371 (quotation omitted). Consequently, a court must determine that a
defendant “actually understood the charges, the constitutional rights, and the
likely consequences of the plea and voluntarily chose to plead guilty.” State v.
Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16, 309 P.3d 230.
In determining whether a plea is knowing or voluntary, appellate courts
examine not only the transcripts of the plea hearing but also the evidence about
the circumstances surrounding the plea. Id. Both the plea hearing transcript and
the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the plea—viewed in the light most
favorable to Mr. Arriaga—show that his plea was not knowing or voluntary.
During the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga made self-defense statements that negated
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his plea to first-degree murder. And the circumstances surrounding the plea
show that Mr. Arriaga did not understand his plea, because trial counsel
discussed the plea with him in English when Mr. Arriaga could only speak
Spanish. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion, then, that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was
knowing and voluntary was simply incorrect.
1.1

Mr. Arriaga’s Self-Defense Statements Negated an
Essential Element of His Murder Plea

Mr. Arriaga twice asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Those
statements show that his murder plea was not knowing or voluntary.
A plea is not knowing or voluntary when the defendant does not
understand the “essential elements of the crime to which he pled guilty.”
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 30 (quotation omitted). “A necessary element of a
murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses.” State v. Low, 2008 UT
58, ¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867. An affirmative defense to murder is imperfect selfdefense. Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(a), (c)(i). Imperfect self-defense reduces a
murder conviction to manslaughter—a second-degree felony that does not carry a
potential life sentence. Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(c)(i) (affirmative defense), 76-5205(3) (manslaughter is a second-degree felony), 76-3-203(2) (sentencing
parameters for felonies).
Mr. Arriaga made two statements during the plea colloquy evidencing that
he did not understand the essential elements of murder.
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When the district court asked for a factual basis, trial counsel responded
that Mr. Arriaga and Mr. Herrera got into a fight, and Mr. Arriaga pulled out a
gun and shot Mr. Herrera. (Add. B, R. 413.) Mr. Arriaga then stated, “I defended
myself. It was not my intention. I never thought about hurting him.” (Id.) The
district court then asked if Mr. Arriaga’s statement changed the plea, and trial
counsel stated that he had discussed the “imperfect self-defense concept.” (Id.)
Immediately after trial counsel finished talking, the district court noted, “I will
find that that is a sufficient factual basis.” (Id.) Mr. Arriaga again interjected, “He
was drugged and drunk and I didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife and that’s
why I . . . .” (Id.) The district court then asked Mr. Arriaga if he understood that
by pulling the trigger he could kill Mr. Herrera, and Mr. Arriaga said yes. (Add. B,
R. 414.) Mr. Arriaga then pleaded guilty. (Add. B, R. 415.)
In circumstances where a defendant pleads guilty but makes statements
during a plea colloquy evidencing either that he does not understand the charged
crime or that negate an element of the charged crime, such pleas are not knowing
or voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2012)
(vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed responsibility for
a certain amount of drugs, and the amount of drugs was an essential element of
the crime); United States v. Suarez, 155 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the defendant did not plead guilty to possession with intent to distribute
when the defendant stated, “I am only guilty of possession”); State v. Thurman,
911 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah 1996) (holding that even though defendant acknowledged
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at one point he had the appropriate mental state, he made repeated comments
that negated his admission and consequently did not admit to the requisite
mental state).
For example, in United States v. Fernandez, the Seventh Circuit held that a
native of Mexico who had only a fifth-grade education and a very limited
understanding of English (the exact same situation Mr. Arriaga is in) did not
understand the charges or the acts to which he was pleading guilty. 205 F.3d
1020, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2000). When the district court asked the defendant if he
had done the things in the factual proffer, the defendant responded, “Not all the
acts, partially”; when the district court asked what acts he did not commit, the
defendant responded, “Yes, your Honor, I did.” Id. at 1026. The district court did
not clear up the defendant’s confusion and accepted the defendant’s guilty plea.
Id. The Seventh Circuit vacated the plea. Id. at 1030.
Similarly, in People v. Ramirez, the court reasoned that a defendant who
pleaded guilty to burglary made statements during the colloquy that negated the
plea. 839 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329–30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). Specifically, the “defendant
insisted during the plea colloquy, albeit in a confused and rambling manner, that
he had permission to enter the residence through an open door and retrieve the
items that he took. These statements explaining defendant’s presence in the
house effectively negated his admission to the elements of knowingly entering
unlawfully and intent to commit a crime therein at the time of entry.” Id. at 329.
Because the district court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry into the defendant’s
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mental culpability after making his statements, “there is no indication in the
record that defendant’s misapprehension of the charges was corrected or that the
plea was voluntary and rational.” Id. at 330.
Along the same lines, the Seventh Circuit held that a Spanish-speaking
defendant did not understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him;
the defendant made statements during the colloquy that showed he did not
understand the concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was
pleading guilty. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 771 (7th
Cir. 2007).
Similar to the defendants in these cases, Mr. Arriaga asserted twice during
the plea colloquy that he acted in self-defense. (Add B., R. 413.) Although Mr.
Arriaga seemed to claim perfect self-defense during the colloquy, he admits—for
purposes of this appeal—that he would only be entitled to an imperfect selfdefense claim. If the State did not disprove Mr. Arriaga’s imperfect self-defense
claim, Mr. Arriaga’s criminal culpability would drop from murder to
manslaughter. But trial counsel and the prosecutor informed the district court
that a sufficient factual basis existed for murder if Mr. Arriaga admitted only that
he had knowingly and intentionally killed Mr. Herrera. (Add. B, R. 414.) This
representation was incorrect because Mr. Arriaga made assertions that he was
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trying to avail himself of a self-defense argument, an element that is completely
separate from the knowingly and intentional killing element. 4
No one explained to Mr. Arriaga that he should not plead guilty to murder
where the imperfect self-defense claim, if successful, would result in a reduction
of the murder charge to a manslaughter charge. (See Add. B, R. 413–415.) Trial
counsel never asked for a brief recess to discuss the self-defense issue with Mr.
Arriaga and clear up his confusion. See Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d at 772
(“At any point during the colloquy, the district court could have taken a brief
recess in order to allow counsel to talk with his client confidentially, address [the
defendant’s] apparent confusion, and determine if he did indeed wish to proceed
with a plea. Such a conference might have helped to avoid the problems that
occurred here.”
The district court—whose responsibility it is to “ensure that defendants
enter pleas knowingly and voluntarily”—never asked Mr. Arriaga directly if he
understood the implications of his self-defense claim. See Candland, 2013 UT 55,
¶ 14. The court did ask trial counsel if the first self-defense assertion changed the
plea, and trial counsel said that he had talked with Mr. Arriaga about imperfect
self-defense. (Add. B, R. 413–15.) But immediately after trial counsel told the

Murder is the knowing and intentional killing of another person. Utah
Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). Imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant
knowingly and intentionally kills someone but does it under a mistaken but
reasonable belief that the killing was justified by law. Utah Code § 76-5203(4)(a).
4
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court about that discussion, Mr. Arriaga again claimed self-defense; the hearing
soldiered on without any further explanation. (Id.)
Without understanding that he could admit to knowingly or intentionally
killing Mr. Herrera and that he could still defeat the State’s murder charge
through a claim of imperfect self-defense, Mr. Arriaga could not intelligently
weigh the risks and benefits of going to trial versus pleading guilty. Mr. Arriaga’s
admission that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of Mr. Herrera did
not resolve the issue of whether the killing was done in self-defense. Mr. Arriaga’s
plea was not knowing because he did not understand that his imperfect selfdefense claim would reduce his criminal culpability from murder to
manslaughter.
The evidence on the record at the plea colloquy shows that Mr. Arriaga did
not knowingly plead guilty.
1.2

The Circumstances Surrounding the Guilty Plea Show that
Mr. Arriaga’s Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary

In deciding whether a defendant has entered a valid plea, courts examine
both the transcript of the plea colloquy and the circumstances surrounding the
plea, including the information the defendant received from his attorney.
Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16; Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, ¶ 17, 88 P.3d 353.
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The circumstances surrounding Mr. Arraiga’s plea show that Mr. Arriaga did not
understand his plea because of a language barrier between him and trial counsel. 5
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, has a fifth-grade
education, and did not speak English except for a few random words at the time
he pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1177; R. 1339–40.) Trial counsel spoke English and
not Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177.)
Immediately before the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel.
(Add. C, R. 1178.) No interpreter was present, so Mr. Arriaga did not fully
understand trial counsel. (Add. C, R. 1177.) In fact, what Mr. Arriaga believed trial
counsel told him was that Mr. Arriaga had already been found guilty and that
there was no need for a trial; that if Mr. Arriaga won at trial, he would still get
prison time; that Mr. Arriaga had no choice but to sign the plea agreement to get
a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment; and that Mr. Arriaga had to plead
guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Because of the language barrier, Mr. Arriaga
did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent
until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)

Mr. Arriaga made the factual assertions about the circumstances
surrounding his guilty plea in his second amended petition. (R. 445–50.) The
State did not answer the second amended petition; rather, the State moved for
summary judgment. (R. 1321.) There was no evidentiary hearing on the second
amended petition. (R. 1321; see R. 502–51.) But the State’s summary judgment
motion and reply did not dispute any of the facts that Mr. Arriaga alleged about
the circumstances surrounding his plea. (R. 823–28; 1198–1204.)
5
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When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Id.) And
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from
his trial counsel. (Id.)
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga—which is
required at the summary judgment stage—this Court should conclude that Mr.
Arriaga completely misunderstood the nature of his guilty plea. From his trial
counsel he believed he had to plead guilty, he did not read the plea affidavit
before signing it, and during the plea colloquy he was operating under what he
believed trial counsel told him. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) His two self-defense
statements during the plea colloquy evidence his confusion.
The circumstances surrounding the guilty plea show that Mr. Arriaga did
not knowingly plead guilty.
1.3

The Court of Appeals Erred When It Upheld the Plea

Although Mr. Arriaga pointed to his self-defense statements during the
plea colloquy and his language barrier with trial counsel, the Court of Appeals
still determined that the plea was knowing and voluntary. It founded its analysis
on Mr. Arriaga signing a plea affidavit and the district court resolving the tension
between the plea affidavit and the self-defense statements. It also disregarded
Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction affidavit as self-serving and contrary to his
statements during the plea colloquy. And the concurring judge concluded that
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even if there was an error with the plea, Mr. Arriaga was not prejudiced. Mr.
Arriaga will take each of these issues in turn.
1.3.1

The Plea Affidavit Did Not Render the Plea
Voluntary

The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Mr. Arriaga told the district
court that “he had reviewed and understood his plea affidavit, there is no doubt
that [Mr. Arriaga] understood the elements of the murder charge at the time of
his guilty plea.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 12.
But the Court of Appeals is wrong. The plea affidavit did not mention selfdefense at all. (Add. F, R. 79–89.) The elements of murder are simply listed as
“Def. did knowingly and intentionally cause[] the death of another.” (Add. F, R.
81.)
But the lack of an affirmative defense is an essential element of murder.
See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45 (affirmative defense is essential element of murder);
Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(a), (c)(i) (imperfect self-defense an affirmative
defense). Because the plea affidavit said nothing about the affirmative defense of
imperfect self-defense, the plea affidavit did not inform Mr. Arriaga of all the
essential elements of murder. Mr. Arriaga could not have understood the impact
of his self-defense claim by reading the plea affidavit.
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1.3.2

Mr. Arriaga Has Overcome the Presumption That
Trial Counsel Adequately Informed Him

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the plea was voluntary because
trial counsel informed the district court he had explained imperfect self-defense
to Mr. Arriaga. It explained: “Trial counsel assured the district court that the
concept of imperfect self-defense had been explained to [Mr. Arriaga], and where
[Mr. Arriaga] had previously told the court he understood everything counsel had
explained to him, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that [Mr. Arriaga]
understood how the imperfect self-defense theory applied in his case.
Furthermore, with the benefit of an interpreter during the plea colloquy, [Mr.
Arriaga] made no objection to trial counsel’s assurance that [Mr. Arriaga]
understood.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 13.
This reasoning ignores the realities of Mr. Arriaga’s situation.
“Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually
may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been properly
informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.”
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). However, the presumption that a
defendant’s trial counsel has appropriately informed the defendant can be
overcome by statements a defendant makes during the plea colloquy.
For example, in Hicks v. Franklin, the Tenth Circuit held that the
defendant overcame the presumption that his counsel adequately informed him
about the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty—second-degree
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(depraved mind) murder. 546 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008). In that case, the
defendant first affirmed during the plea colloquy that he had “talked over the
charges” with his attorney. Id. But when the district court asked whether the
defendant understood the charge, the defendant stated that he did not know what
a “dangerous act” meant. Id. Furthermore, the district court’s explanation of
“dangerous act” was erroneous, and the defendant’s attorney remained silent and
did not correct the district court’s misstatement. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded,
“[W]here a defendant affirmatively indicates to the court that he does not
understand a critical element of the charge against him, the presumption that a
defendant has been sufficiently notified by defense counsel of what he is being
asked to admit will typically be unwarranted.” Id.
In United States v. Weeks, the Tenth Circuit again held that a defendant’s
statements during a plea colloquy rebutted the presumption that his counsel
adequately informed him of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading.
653 F.3d 1188, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011). Again in that case, the defendant affirmed
during the plea colloquy that he fully discussed his conspiracy charge with his
attorney. Id. But his statements during the plea colloquy showed that he did not
understand the elements of conspiracy; specifically, he denied that he had
“knowingly” done an act but was just a “party to it.” Id. The district court
attempted to clear up the confusion; the defendant eventually affirmed that he
now knew that there was a violation of the law. Id. at 1203. But the Tenth Circuit
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held that the defendant’s admission “that he now knows those activities violated
the law, is not definitively an admission he knew at the time he agreed to the
activities that they were illegal.” Id.
Similar to the defendants in Hicks and Weeks, Mr. Arriaga affirmed during
the plea colloquy that he understood his conversations with his attorney, that he
had been through a plea affidavit with his attorney, and that he did not have
questions. (Add. B, R. 412–13.) But the plea colloquy did not stop there. Mr.
Arriaga made self-defense assertions after his attorney gave a factual basis for his
murder plea, and Mr. Arriaga again asserted self-defense after his attorney
informed the district court that he had spoken with Mr. Arriaga about imperfect
self-defense. (Add. B, R. 413.) At no time did the district court or trial counsel
explain to Mr. Arriaga the implications of his self-defense claim, and Mr.
Arriaga’s trial counsel did not ask for a recess to clear up Mr. Arriaga’s confusion.
(Add. B, R. 413–414.) Mr. Arriaga’s statements during the plea colloquy itself—
self-defense assertions that were never sufficiently mitigated by the court or trial
counsel—rebut the presumption that Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel adequately
explained the implications of Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense claims.
Furthermore, Mr. Arriaga never recanted his self-defense assertions on the
record during the plea colloquy. (Id.) Rather, he affirmed that he knew he would
kill the victim by pulling the trigger. (Add. B, R. 414.) But merely affirming that
he pulled the trigger, in the face of self-defense claims, is insufficient for a valid
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first-degree murder plea. See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45 (“[T]he absence of
affirmative defenses is an element of murder.”). Because Mr. Arriaga made
statements that he was acting in self-defense and did not recant those statements,
he did not understand the elements of murder.
The presumption that trial counsel adequately explained the implications
of the self-defense claim to Mr. Arriaga is rebutted by evidence on the record—
Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the colloquy (one of which was made
after trial counsel said he had explained imperfect self-defense to Mr. Arriaga),
the failure of the district court or trial counsel to explain the self-defense claims
to Mr. Arriaga on the record, and the absence of any information about selfdefense in the plea affidavit.
1.3.3

The District Court Did Not Resolve the Confusion
Between the Plea Affidavit and the Self-Defense
Statements

The majority of the Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court did
sufficiently address the conflict between the plea affidavit and Mr. Arriaga’s selfdefense statements when the court asked Mr. Arriaga “whether he knew that his
actions, specifically pulling the trigger of the gun, would cause Victim’s death.
Defendant acknowledged that he did.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 14.
However, the concurring judge expressed concern about whether the
district “court’s attempts to resolve the conflict were successful.” Id. ¶ 22. Mr.
Arriaga’s acknowledgment that he knew that pulling the trigger would cause the
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victim’s death, the concurring judge continued, “did not speak to the conflict
created by his assertions: whether he understood that in pleading guilty to first
degree murder he was conceding that the concept of imperfect self-defense did
not apply.” Id. ¶ 24.
The concurring judge was right.
Murder is the knowing and intentional killing of another person. Utah
Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). Imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant
knowingly and intentionally kills someone but does it under a mistaken but
reasonable belief that the killing was justified by law. Utah Code § 76-5203(4)(a). The affirmative defense is another element of murder that must be
disproved by the State. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45.
The district court merely asking Mr. Arriaga if he knew that he would kill
someone by pulling the trigger did nothing to resolve Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense
claims. That comment did not address the additional element of the State being
required to disprove Mr. Arriaga’s imperfect self-defense claim.
1.3.4

Mr. Arriaga’s Affidavit Is Not Self-Serving

The Court of Appeals also concluded that Mr. Arriaga’s claims that he did
not read the plea affidavit contradicted his own statements during the plea
colloquy. “Here, there is no valid reason to doubt the truthfulness of [Mr.
Arriaga’s] statements to the district court during his plea colloquy because an
interpreter was present and [Mr. Arriaga] professed to understand everything

26

discussed with counsel and the contents of his plea affidavit.” Arriaga, 2018 UT
App 160, ¶ 15.
It is true that a defendant cannot merely allege in a postconviction petition
that he did not understand what was going on during the plea colloquy. But that
is not the case here. Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction affidavit explains why he made
multiple self-defense assertions during his plea colloquy, despite his attorney
representing to the district court that he had explained the implications of the
self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga. His postconviction petition affidavit does not
contradict what happened during the plea colloquy; it explains why Mr. Arriaga
acted the way he did during the plea colloquy.
1.3.5

Mr. Arriaga Was Prejudiced

The concurring judge was concerned about the validity of Mr. Arriaga’s
guilty plea. But she concurred in the result because, she concluded, Mr. Arriaga
could not show prejudice—he could not show it would have been rational to reject
the State’s plea offer. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 27.
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, “[t]he court may not grant relief
from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would
be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts
proved in the post-conviction proceeding.” Utah Code § 78B-9-104(2). The
prejudice standard in the act is the same as the prejudice standard under an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim: a “reasonable probability that, but for
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Utah courts have
looked to the prejudice prong in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel caselaw when
deciding whether defendants have shown prejudice in their postconviction
claims. Landry v. State, 2016 UT App 164, ¶ 23 n.6, 380 P.3d 25 (“The Strickland
prejudice requirement is the same standard a petitioner must demonstrate to
obtain postconviction relief.”). This Court has also looked to ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel caselaw when deciding whether a defendant has shown
prejudice under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21,
416 P.3d 443; State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ¶¶ 21-23, 154 P.3d 788; State v. Dean,
2004 UT 63, ¶ 22, 95 P.3d 276.
This Court should continue to use the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
prejudice framework to decide whether Mr. Arriaga was shown prejudice. In a
recent case, the United States Supreme Court considered how a defendant could
show prejudice when he had pleaded guilty because of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964–69 (2017).
In that case, the government charged a lawful permanent resident, Jae Lee,
with drug possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 1963. Government officials
had found drugs and cash in Lee’s home, and Lee had admitted that he had given
drugs to his friends. Id. When offered a plea to drug distribution, Lee’s attorney
told him to take the plea because he would likely receive a lighter sentence. Id.
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Lee asked his attorney if he could be deported, and his attorney said no. Id. So
Lee took the plea. Id. He later found out that his drug distribution conviction
required deportation, and he sought to withdraw his plea because of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that although Lee’s trial
prospects were grim, he could show prejudice—he would have rejected the plea
had he known that it carried the consequence of mandatory deportation. Id. at
1967.
The Court reasoned, “When a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient
performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask
whether, had he gone to trial, the result of that trial would have been different
than the result of the plea bargain.” Id. at 1965. Rather, a court considers whether
“the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In deciding whether a defendant would have been better off going to trial,
the Court differentiated between two types of claims: claims that trial counsel’s
errors affected the defendant’s prospects of success at trial (such as trial counsel
not filing a motion to suppress) and claims that trial counsel’s errors affected the
defendant’s understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty. Id. at 1965.
For the first set of claims—attorney error effecting the prospects of success at
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trial—a defendant must show he would have been better off going to trial. Id. But
for the second set of claims—attorney error effecting the defendant’s
understanding of the plea—a defendant need not show he would have done better
at trial. Id.
Consequently, the Court rejected a per se rule that a defendant with no
viable defense cannot show prejudice. Id. at 1966. It reasoned, “The decision
whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a
conviction after trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the
defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial
may look attractive.” Id. at 1966. “For example, a defendant with no realistic
defense to a charge carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if
the prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years.” Id. at 1966–67.
According to the Court, “avoiding deportation was the determinative
factor” for Lee, and Lee said that he “would have rejected any plea leading to
deportation—even if it shaved off prison time—in favor of throwing a ‘Hail Mary’
at trial.” Id. at 1967. Because deportation was so important to Lee, it was not
“irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial.
But for his attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the
plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost
certainly.” Id. at 1968. “Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to
reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.” Id. at 1969.

30

In this case, the State charged Mr. Arriaga with first-degree murder,
possession of a dangerous weapon (a second-degree felony), and obstructing
justice (a second-degree felony). Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree
murder, and the State dropped the two lesser charges. (Add. B, R. 410.) The State
did not make a sentencing recommendation. The presumptive sentence for firstdegree murder is 15 years to life, Utah Code § 76-5-203(3)(b), and that is what
Mr. Arriaga got. (Add. B, R. 416.) As the Court noted in Lee, the consequences of
pleading guilty and going to trial were “similarly dire,” so “even the smallest
chance of success at trial may look attractive.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966.
And the error here was not one that affected Mr. Arriaga’s trial prospects.
Rather, the error is the failure to inform Mr. Arriaga about the relationship
between his self-defense claim and his murder plea. Like the defendant in Lee,
Mr. Arriaga made statements during the plea colloquy about what really mattered
to him—his self-defense claim. And he submitted a postconviction affidavit where
he said that if he actually understood the nature of his plea, he would not have
pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1179.)
Admittedly, Mr. Arriaga’s chances at trial may have been slim. He shot Mr.
Herrera five times, two of which hit him in the back and one that hit him in the
back of the head. But the only evidence against Mr. Arriaga was a statement that
he made to the police, where Mr. Arriaga said that he got into a fight with Mr.
Herrera and that Mr. Herrera lunged at Mr. Arriaga before Mr. Arriaga shot him.
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(R. 215.) 6 That evidence would support an imperfect self-defense instruction. See
Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 34 (holding that district court properly instructed the jury on
imperfect self-defense when the defendant testified that he shot the victim after
the victim charged him).
Through his postconviction affidavit and his self-defense statements
during the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga has shown a reasonable probability that “he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 137
S. Ct. at 1966 (quotation omitted). And given that the plea bargain was not
substantially better than what he would have received had he been found guilty at
trial, it was not irrational for him to decline the plea and go to trial.

In sum, this Court should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not
knowing or voluntary. His self-defense statements during the plea colloquy, left
unresolved by the district court and trial counsel, negated an essential element of
his plea. And given the evidence of the language barrier between trial counsel and
Mr. Arriaga—evidence that must be viewed in the light most favorable to Mr.
Arriaga—trial counsel’s brief assertion that he talked about imperfect self-defense
with Mr. Arriaga does not correct the error. Furthermore, Mr. Arriaga’s selfAccording to trial counsel, the State’s case relied on two main pieces of
evidence: a statement from Mr. Arriaga’s brother and Mr. Arriaga’s statement to
the police. (R. 527–28.) The brother fled the country and was likely unavailable
to testify. (R. 528.) That left only Mr. Arriaga’s statement to the police.
6
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defense statements and postconviction affidavit show that had he known about
the impact of his self-defense assertions on his murder plea, he would have
chosen to forgo the plea and go to trial. Consequently, this Court should reverse
the Court of Appeals.
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2.

Mr. Arriaga’s Counsel Was Ineffective
Before the Court of Appeals, Mr. Arriaga also argued that his guilty plea

was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, a defendant may challenge his
conviction if it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah Code §
78B-9-104(1)(d). Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel was ineffective when he did not use
an interpreter to explain the plea to Mr. Arriaga. As a result of that failure, Mr.
Arriaga believed he was required to plead guilty to murder.
For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Arriaga must satisfy the
Strickland standard, which requires him to prove “(1) that counsel’s performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” State v. Larrabee, 2013
UT 70, ¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfies the
Strickland standard.
2.1

Mr. Arriaga’s Trial Counsel Was Deficient

Trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter to advise Mr.
Arriaga about his guilty plea in a meeting before the plea hearing.
“[T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or
enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in
securing convictions and determining sentences.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156,
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169 (2012). That is because our criminal justice system “is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Id.
As our system is one of pleas, a defendant has a right to effective assistance
of counsel when being advised whether to enter a guilty plea. Id.; Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Also, an attorney “shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.4(b). “[C]ourts in other
jurisdictions have explained in addressing the constitutional concerns raised by
failing to provide an interpreter for an accused, every criminal defendant—if the
right to be present is to have meaning—[must] possess sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”
Ling v. State, 702 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ga. 2010) (quotation omitted). In fact, “[o]ne
who is unable to communicate effectively in English and does not receive an
interpreter’s assistance is no more competent to proceed than an individual who
is incompetent due to mental incapacity.” Id.
Mr. Arriaga is a native Spanish speaker with a fifth-grade education who
did not speak English (with the exception of a few random words) at the time he
pleaded guilty, and his trial counsel did not speak Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177; R.
1339–40.)
No interpreter was present when Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel before
the plea hearing; because there was no interpreter, Mr. Arriaga misunderstood
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trial counsel’s advice about the plea. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Mr. Arriaga believed
trial counsel told him that he had already been found guilty and that there was no
need for a trial; that if Mr. Arriaga won at trial, he would still get prison time; and
that Mr. Arriaga had to plead guilty that day. (Id.) Because of the language
barrier, Mr. Arriaga did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and
that he was innocent until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)
When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Id.) And
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from
trial counsel. (Id.) That Mr. Arriaga misunderstood what was going on is
evidenced by his two assertions during the plea colloquy that he acted in selfdefense. (Add. B, R. 413.)
Trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter to
communicate with Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea. A criminal defendant must
adequately understand the contours of his constitutional rights and the facts
underlying his plea before he can make an informed decision about whether to
plead guilty. See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16. When the substantive conversation
between an attorney and his client about those protections and those facts takes
place without an interpreter, and the attorney and the client do not speak the
same language, the attorney’s conduct falls below the objective standard of
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reasonableness. See Ling, 702 S.E.2d at 883. 7 An attorney cannot fulfill his duties
to communicate with his client and to give his client sufficient information to
make an informed decision when the attorney and the client speak different
languages and no means of translation is available. Trial counsel was ineffective
when he did not use an interpreter to communicate with Mr. Arriaga.
The Court of Appeals, however, determined that trial counsel was not
deficient. In so doing, it did not view the facts in the light most favorable to Mr.
Arriaga, as it is required to do on summary judgment. Rather, it flatly dismissed
his assertions of a language barrier because Mr. Arriaga did not inform the
district court during the plea colloquy that he could not communicate with trial
counsel. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 18. 8
Mr. Arriaga’s acknowledgment in the plea colloquy that he understood his
conversations with trial counsel is undermined by his self-defense assertions.
(Add. B, R. 412, 414–15.) If Mr. Arriaga truly understood what trial counsel told

Even if trial counsel does use an interpreter, “[t]rial counsel may breach a
duty owed to his client through the ineffective assistance of an interpreter. When
an intermediary, such as an interpreter, is the only means of communication for a
defendant and his attorney, any deficient conduct on the part of the intermediary
can be imputed to the attorney as ineffective assistance.” Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 149 (Iowa 2001).
7

One Court of Appeals judge also expressed skepticism at oral argument
about the claims of a language barrier because Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction
affidavit is written in English. But the hand that wrote the English portion of the
affidavit was not the same hand that signed the affidavit. Mr. Arriaga received
significant help from bilingual inmates when preparing his legal papers in
English.
8
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him about the plea, he would not have raised self-defense claims during the
hearing. This Court should choose to “credit more fully [Mr. Arriaga’s] repeated
statements” during a plea colloquy about self-defense—evidencing his
misunderstanding of what trial counsel told him—rather than a one-worded
“acknowledg[ment] at one point” that he understood his conversations with trial
counsel. See Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorably to Mr. Arriaga, trial
counsel was deficient when he did not have an interpreter at the meeting with
Mr. Arriaga before the plea hearing.
2.2

Mr. Arriaga Was Prejudiced

Mr. Arriaga can also show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance.
To show prejudice, a defendant must prove that there is a “reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The
reasonable probability standard does not mean that the defendant must show
“that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the
case.” Id. at 693. Rather, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Arriaga could not show prejudice
because, given the evidence that Mr. Herrera was shot three times in the back
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and twice it front, it was irrational for Mr. Arriaga to reject the plea to murder
and go to trial. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 20. But in making this decision, the
Court of Appeals ignored binding United States Supreme Court precedent that
changed the prejudice analysis for cases where a defendant took a guilty plea
because of ineffective assistance of counsel: Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958
(2017). When an issue is a “matter of federal jurisprudence, our courts must be
in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT
49, ¶ 3, 428 P.3d 1052. 9
Mr. Arriaga has discussed Lee extensively in section 1.3.5, above. In short,
Lee held that for attorney error that effects the defendant’s understanding of the
consequences of his plea—not attorney error that effects the defendant’s
prospects of success at trial—a defendant does not have to prove that he would
have had a viable defense at trial. 137 S. Ct. at 1965–67. “The decision whether to
plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction
after trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the defendant's
perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may look
attractive.” Id. at 1966. “For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a
charge carrying a 20–year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the
prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years.” Id. at 1966–67.

Lee was issued after the briefing concluded in this case, but before the
Court of Appeals issued its opinion. Mr. Arriaga filed a Rule 24(j) letter with the
Court of Appeals informing it of Lee.
9
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In Lee, “avoiding deportation was the determinative factor” for Lee, and
Lee said that he “would have rejected any plea leading to deportation—even if it
shaved off prison time—in favor of throwing a ‘Hail Mary’ at trial.” Id. at 1967.
Because deportation was so important to Lee, it was not “irrational for a
defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But for his
attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea
agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly.”
Id. at 1968. “Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to reject the
plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.” Id. at 1969.
As argued above, trial counsel’s error was not one that effected Mr.
Arriaga’s prospects at trial; therefore, Mr. Arriaga does not have to prove that he
would have prevailed at trial. Rather, trial counsel’s error went to Mr. Arriaga’s
understanding about his plea. Because the error effected his understanding of his
plea, Mr. Arriaga has to show whatever he misunderstood was important and
determinative to him. He can do that.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga—as this Court
must do when reviewing a summary judgment order—this Court should conclude
that trial counsel’s error in not having an interpreter at the meeting before the
plea prejudiced Mr. Arriaga. Mr. Arriaga stated in his postconviction affidavit
that he completely misunderstood trial counsel during that meeting. (Add. C, R.
1177–78.) He believed he had to plead guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) And his assertions
of self-defense during the plea colloquy show that he was operating under a
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significant misunderstanding from his conversation with trial counsel. Mr.
Arriaga stated in his affidavit that had he understood his conversation with trial
counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1179.)
And like the defendant in Lee, it was perfectly rational for Mr. Arriaga to go
to trial. The plea was not a significantly better deal. Yes, the State dropped two
second-degree felonies, but the first-degree murder charge with a 15-to-life
sentence still remained. (R. 410, 416.) And Mr. Arriaga did have a defense, unlike
the defendant in Lee. The defendant in Lee had no defense to his drug
distribution claim—the government had found drugs and money in his house,
and the defendant had admitted that he gave drugs to his friends. 137 S. Ct. at
1963. But here, Mr. Arriaga had an imperfect self-defense claim; Mr. Herrera
lunged at him before Mr. Arriaga shot the gun. That self-defense claim was so
important to Mr. Arriaga that he raised it twice during the plea colloquy.
Under Lee, Mr. Arriaga can show prejudice—that if trial counsel had an
interpreter at the meeting, Mr. Arriaga would not have pleaded guilty and would
have proceeded to trial.
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals.

Conclusion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arraiga, this Court
should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary and was
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the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the State.
DATED this 9thth day of March 2019.
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
/s/ Emily Adams
Emily Adams (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
PO Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625
Attorney for
Petitioner/Appellant
Benjamin Arriaga
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Addendum A
District court orders: Memorandum Decision (R. 1219–21)
and Order (R. 1262–70)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

BENJAMIN ARRIGA,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.120404690
Judge:

Charlene Barlow

STATE OF UTAH,

Res ondent.
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for summary judgment on
petitioner's second amended petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act. The Court
recognizes the assistance of James D. Gilson who was appointed by the Court to represent petitioner

pro bono; the Court appreciates his willingness to assist in this case.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Arriaga filed a prose petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act on April
6, 2012. The Court reviewed the petition and ordered the appointment of counsel on April 12, 2012.
As directed in rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court reviewed the petition and
found that its claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not frivolous on their face and
dismissed all claims not involving the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. A copy of the
pleadings were sent to the Utah Attorney General's Office. The ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were allowed to proceed.
The counsel originally appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga was allowed to withdraw and Mr.
Gilson was appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga and was given time to become familiar with the case.
Discovery was pursued and an evidentiary hearing was set for May 23, 2014.
At the hearing on May 23, 2014, Mark Mathis, prosecutor for Mr. Arriaga's case, testified
regarding the charging of the case, the strength of the case in his opinion, and discussions with
defense counsel regarding plea negotiations. Rudy Bautista, trial counsel for Mr. Arriaga, testified
as to his experience, his filing of the motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga's statements to the police, plea
discussions with Mr. Mathis, his investigation into the evidence, the flight of Mr. Arriaga's brother
1
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(who had been considered a potential witness) after release from jail, and (to a limited extent) his
discussions with Mr. Arriaga regarding resolution of the case. The hearing ended when counsel for
Mr. Arriaga asked for time to amend the petition, which request was granted.
The second amended petition was filed on September 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits.
The State filed a motion for summary judgment on November 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits.
A corrected memorandum in support was filed on November 20, 2014. On May 4, 2015, Mr.
Arriaga filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's motion and, on June 8, 2015, the State filed
a reply memorandum.
The Court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2015.
Mr. Arriaga was present with counsel, James D. Gilson; the State was represented by Mark C. Field,
Assistant Attorney General. The Court received argument and took the matter under advisement.
Having reviewed the submissions, including exhibits, and the arguments, the Court now enters its
ruling.
DECISION
The Court finds that summary judgment for the State is appropriate in this case for the
reasons stated in the State's memorandum and reply memorandum in support of the motion.
Generally, the Court finds that Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel acted within reason in his handling of the
case. The Court finds that Mr. Arriaga assured the Court in the plea statement and in the colloquy
that he was satisfied with the advice of his counsel and understood the rights he was giving up. His
self-serving current claims that he didn't read the statement and didn't understand what he was doing
are unavailing to negate his statements at the time of the plea. The Court also finds that there is not
a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Arriaga would have rejected the plea and taken the matter to trial.
His confession was not suppressed and, even if it had not been used at trial, the fact that the victim
was shot five times, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head could have convinced any
reasonable jury that the shooting was not accidental as claimed by Mr. Arriaga.
Within this general outline of the Court's reasoning, the Court adopts the specific arguments
that the State made in its memoranda to support the Court's conclusion that summary judgment is
appropriate in this matter.

2
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ORDER
The State's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the petition for post-conviction
relief is DENIED.
The State is ordered to prepare an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law

consistent with

thi!,decision.

DATEDthis_L_dayof

1
£.i~k-_

,2015.
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The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: November 02, 2015
/s/ Charlene Barlow
10:58:40 AM
District Court Judge

MARK C. FIELD (8340)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: 801-366-0180
markfield@utah.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BENJAMIN ARRIAGA,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 120404690

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Judge Charlene Barlow

THIS MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT on the State’s Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on November 19, 2014. Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga filed his opposition
memorandum on May 4, 2015. The State’s reply memorandum was filed on June 8, 2015. Oral
argument on the State’s motion was heard on September 4, 2015. Mr. Arriaga was present and
represented by his attorney, James D. Gilson. The State was represented by Mark Field,
Assistant Attorney General. The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda, the relevant case
law, all applicable rules and statutory provisions, and considered the oral arguments presented by

1262
November 02, 2015 10:58 AM

1 of 9

counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court enters the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law and order GRANTING the State’s motion for summary judgment.
Background
On April 4, 2010, Mr. Arriaga confronted Benacio Herrera in an open field in West
Jordan about claims that Mr. Herrera had slept with Mr. Arriaga’s wife. At some point during
the confrontation, Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband. A struggle ensued and the gun
discharged several times. During his interview with police, Mr. Arriaga admitted that he asked
Mr. Herrera whether he had sexual relations with his (Mr. Arriaga’s) wife, that Mr. Herrera said
“no,” that this made Mr. Arriaga angry and they fought, and that he shot Mr. Herrera, but he only
meant to scare him.
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with several offenses, including murder, a first-degree
felony. Trial counsel, Rudy Bautista filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga’s incriminating
statements to police, which the Court denied. Mr. Arriaga then accepted a plea offer from the
prosecutor and agreed to plead guilty to the murder charge in exchange for the other charges
being dismissed. After pleading guilty, he was immediately sentenced to the mandatory term of
15 years to life in prison. He did not pursue a direct appeal.
Mr. Arriaga timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, an amended petition, and
then a second amended petition. He raised several arguments that his conviction should be
vacated. First, he challenged the effectiveness of his attorney’s representation. Mr. Arriaga
argued that he spoke little English and because his attorney did not have a Spanish interpreter
present during their private conversations, he misunderstood counsel’s advice concerning his
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guilty plea. He also claimed that counsel did not seek discretionary review of the Court’s denial
of the motion to suppress, did not use the potentially appealable ruling as a basis for negotiating
a better plea agreement with the prosecutor, did not seek concessions of the prosecutor in
exchange for the guilty plea, did not advise him to go to trial where the defenses of self-defense,
extreme emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and did
not investigate the facts of the case, hire experts, and interview witnesses.
Second, Mr. Arriaga argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
entered. He asserted that because of his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel’s
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions, he did not
understand that he was innocent until proven guilty, that he did not have to plead guilty, and that
winning at trial would mean no prison time. Third, Mr. Arriaga asserted that because of the
misunderstanding that resulted from his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel’s
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions prior to the changeof-plea hearing, he did not understand his right to appeal his conviction, nor did he understand
the time limit for filing an appeal.
The State responded to the second amended petition with a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that relief was not warranted because Mr. Arriaga’s post-conviction proffer
failed as a matter of law to establish that he received ineffective representation, that his guilty
plea was invalid, or that he was denied his right to appeal. Mr. Arriaga opposed the State’s
motion.
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Findings of Fact
1. Mr. Arriaga was charged on April 14, 2010 with murder, a first-degree felony,
purchase, transfer, or possession, or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second-degree
felony, and obstructing justice, also a second-degree felony.
2. The medical examiner’s report established that Mr. Herrera was shot five times, once
in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head.
3. A Spanish interpreter was not present when Mr. Arriaga’s appointed attorney, Rudy
Bautista, met with him for approximately an hour at the jail and several times when Mr. Arriaga
was transported to the courthouse for a hearing in the case.
4. Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga’s incriminating statements to the
police, which the Court denied.
5. Counsel did not seek interlocutory review of the Court’s order denying the motion.
6. The prosecutor offered to dismiss the obstructing justice and possession of a firearm
by a restricted person charges in exchange for Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea to the murder charge.
7. Mr. Arriaga accepted this offer.
8. A Spanish interpreter was present at the change-of-plea hearing for the benefit of Mr.
Arriaga and the Court.
9. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he was not suffering from any physical or mental
impairment that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings.
10. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he and his attorney fully discussed the contents of the
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (“Plea Statement”), as well as his rights and
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the consequences of pleading guilty.
11. The Plea Statement was written in both English and Spanish,
12. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood the contents of the Plea Statement and
that he adopted each statement in it as his own, that he was satisfied with his attorney’s advice
and assistance, and that he understood everything that his attorney had discussed with him.
13. Mr. Arriaga told the Court that he had no questions about anything in the Plea
Statement.
14. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged in the Plea Statement and during the plea colloquy that he
understood his right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront
witnesses.
15. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood his right to the presumption of
innocence, and that if he wanted to fight the charges against him and go to trial, all he had to do
was plead not guilty and his case would be set for a trial.
16. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that the elements of the crime of murder to which he was
pleading guilty were that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another.
17. After trial counsel provided the factual basis for the offense, Mr. Arriaga told the
Court that the victim was on drugs and drunk, that he was unsure whether the victim had a
weapon, that he defended himself against the victim, and that it was not his intention to hurt the
victim.
18. Trial counsel explained that he and Mr. Arriaga previously discussed the possibility
of raising a defense of imperfect self-defense because the victim charged at Mr. Arriaga and that
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is why he used the gun.
19. The prosecutor explained that in order for the guilty plea to be valid, Mr. Arriaga
would need to state that he either intentionally caused the death or knowingly caused the death of
the victim.
20. Without objection from Mr. Arriaga, trial counsel stated that Mr. Arriaga had
authorized him to tell the Court that by pulling the trigger he knew that it would cause the
victim’s death.
21. Mr. Arriaga specifically acknowledged that he understood that by pulling the trigger
of the gun he knew he could cause the death of the victim.
22. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood he would be pleading guilty to a firstdegree felony and that the minimum and maximum punishment was a prison term of 15 years to
life at the Utah State Prison.
23. Mr. Arriaga also acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guilty he would
be waiving his right to appeal his conviction and that if he wanted to appeal his sentence, he
would need to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after his sentence was entered.
24. Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to the charge of murder and requested the Court to
immediately sentence him to the mandatory term of 15 years to life in prison.
25. Mr. Arriaga did not pursue a direct appeal.
Conclusions of Law
1. Mr. Arriaga bears the burden of pleading and proving the facts necessary to entitle
him to post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1).
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2. As the moving party on summary judgment, the State satisfies its burden “by showing,
by reference to ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶18, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
3. Although Mr. Arriaga is entitled to the benefit of having the Court consider the facts
and inferences in a light most favorable to him, to survive summary judgment he must show that
he “could, if given a trial [or evidentiary hearing], produce evidence which would reasonably
sustain a judgment in his favor.” Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶43, 267 P.3d 232.
4. To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Arriaga must “show
that counsel’s performance was deficient” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
5. While Mr. Arriaga must show that counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness,” id. at 688, to prove deficient performance, the Court “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689.
6. To satisfy the prejudice element of the Strickland standard in the context of a guilty
plea challenge based on counsel ineffectiveness, Mr. Arriaga “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been rational under the
circumstances.” Ramirez–Gil v. State, 2014 UT App 122, ¶8, 327 P.3d 1228 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); Hill
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v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
7. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he should not be bound by the representations he made
during the change-of-plea hearing. See Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 191 (4th Cir. 2000).
Cf. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)
8. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he could not adequately understand his counsel’s
advice about the guilty plea, even though a Spanish interpreter was not present, and therefore has
not shown that counsel performed deficiently for not having a Spanish interpreter present during
their private discussions.
9. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his attorney performed deficiently for not seeking
interlocutory review of the Court’s order denying the motion to suppress, not seeking a better
plea agreement, not advising Mr. Arriaga go to trial and raise defenses of self-defense, extreme
emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and not investigating the
facts of the case, hiring experts, and interviewing witnesses.
10. Mr. Arriaga also has not shown prejudice because he provides no facts or argument
establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been
rational under the circumstances.
11. As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his trial attorney was ineffective.
12. A valid plea is “one that has a factual basis for the plea and ensures that the
defendant understands and waives his constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to
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a jury trial, and the right to confront witnesses.” Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ¶20, 203 P.3d
976.
13. All the constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea were satisfied in Mr.
Arriaga’s case.
14. Even if Mr. Arriaga misunderstood his counsel’s advice in relation to the guilty plea,
any misunderstanding was cured by the Court’s plea colloquy and the Plea Statement.
15. As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary.
16. Because Mr. Arriaga was fully informed at the change-of-plea hearing of his right to
appeal and that the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days after his sentence was entered,
as a matter of law he has not shown that he did not understand his right to appeal.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga’s petition for postconviction relief is DENIED.
This is the final order of the Court. No further action is necessary to effectuate the
Court’s order.

In accordance with rule 10(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judge’s electronic signature appears at the top of
the first page of this Order. END OF DOCUMENT
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Addendum B
Transcript of change-of-plea hearing (R. 408–16)

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
____________________________________

)
STATE OF UTAH,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
)
BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

Case No. 101400853

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT &
COMMITMENT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLENE BARLOW

WEST JORDAN COURTHOUSE
8080 Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

APRIL 19, 2011
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2
3
4
5
6

FOR THE STATE:
Marc C. Mathis, Esq.
Robert Neill, Esq.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-7900

7
8
9
10

FOR THE DEFENSE:
Rudy Bautista, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035
Telephone: 801-534-1700

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

APRIL 19, 2011

2

* * *

3

THE COURT: This is Case Number 101400853,

4

Mr. Bautista is here. Who is here for the state?

5

MR. MATHIS: Mark Mathis, Rob Neill for the state.

6

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mathis and Mr. Neill for the

7
8
9
10

state.
And Mr. Arriaga-Luna has joined us. What are we
going to do today?
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, we're going to resolve

11

this matter. What's anticipated is Benjamin will be entering a

12

guilty plea to count one, murder, a first degree felony. In

13

exchange, the remaining counts will be dismissed.

14

THE COURT: Is that the State's understanding?

15

MR. MATHIS: It is, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Arriaga-Luna, will you please

17

state your full name?

18

THE DEFENDANT: Arriaga-Luna.

19

THE COURT: First name?

20

THE DEFENDANT: Benjamin Arriaga-Luna.

21

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. How old are you?

22

THE DEFENDANT: I'm 38.

23

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any physical or mental

24

problem that interferes with your ability to understand what

25

you're doing today?
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

THE DEFENDANT: No.

2

THE COURT: Have you taken any medication, drugs or

3

alcohol today that would impact your ability to understand?

4

THE DEFENDANT: No.

5

THE COURT: Okay. You are giving up certain rights.

6

Was there a preliminary hearing held in this?

7

MR. BAUTISTA: There was, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Okay. You are giving up certain trial

9

rights by pleading guilty today. You have the right to be

10

presumed to be innocent. You have the right not to testify

11

against yourself.
You have the right to a speedy and public trial in

12
13

front of an impartial jury. You have the right to cross

14

examine the state's witness and call your own witnesses. You

15

have the right to an unanimous verdict on all elements beyond a

16

reasonable doubt. You have certain appeal rights if you go to

17

trial.

18

You are giving up these rights by pleading guilty

19

today, do you understand that?

20

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

21

THE COURT: Okay. There are certain immigration

22

consequences by pleading guilty, too. And you -- you address

23

or you know that you have these consequences, you might be

24

deported by pleading guilty, do you understand that?

25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1
2

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The change that you're
looking at is a first degree felony.

3

Is there a minimum?

4

MR. BAUTISTA: It's 15 years to life.

5

THE COURT: Fifteen to life. Thank you.

6

The potential punishment is 15 years to life in the

7

Utah State Prison and a $10,000 fine. That's the potential

8

punishment, do you understand that?

9
10
11

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, do you believe that he's
competent to enter this plea?

12

MR. BAUTISTA: I do.

13

THE COURT: Do you believe he understands the rights

14
15

that he's giving up?
MR. BAUTISTA: I do. We've been working together for

16

over a year. We did the preliminary hearing, as well as, the

17

motion to suppress which was denied.

18
19

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Arriaga-Luna, are you
satisfied with the help that your attorney has given you?

20

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

21

THE COURT: Do you fully understand everything that

22

he's talked to you about?

23

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I understand.

24

THE COURT: Okay. Have you been through a plea form

25

with your attorney?
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1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

2

THE COURT: Do you have anymore questions about

3

what's in that form?

4

THE DEFENDANT: No. None.

5

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, can you give me a factual

6

basis?
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in Salt

7
8

Lake County Mr. Arriaga-Luna confronted a man who had been

9

sleeping with his wife. An argument and subsequent fight took

10

place at which time he pulled out a firearm and he shot the man

11

killing him.

12

THE COURT: Is that what happened, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?

13

THE DEFENDANT: I defended myself. It was not my

14

intention. I never thought about hurting him.
THE COURT: Okay. Does that change the plea at all,

15
16
17

counsel?
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, we had -- we had discussed

18

the imperfect self-defense concept and that he did pull out a

19

gun to get the man to confess to his sleeping with his wife.

20

And that the man charged at him but he was unarmed. So that is

21

why he used a gun.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: I will find that that is a sufficient
factual basis.
THE DEFENDANT: He was drugged and drunk and I didn't
know if he had a weapon, a knife and that's why I...
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mathis?

2

MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, I think for the colloquy to

3

be valid that the defendant will have to state that he did

4

intentionally take the life of Benacio Hernandez-Herrera. He

5

had stated earlier that he did not intend for that to happen.

6

I think, for it to be a valid plea, he would need to state to

7

this court that he did intend to take his life.

8

MR. BAUTISTA: Or knowingly, Your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Or knowingly. Yes.

10

MR. MATHIS: Intentionally or knowingly.

11

THE COURT: Yeah.

12

MR. BAUTISTA: He is prepared to say, Your Honor,

13

he's asked that I say it, that by pulling the trigger he knew

14

that it would cause the death of the man.

15

THE COURT: Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you understand that

16

by pulling the trigger you knew you could cause the death of

17

the gentleman?

18

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

19

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I will accept that

20

factual basis. Has anyone threatened you or forced you to

21

enter this plea today?

22

THE DEFENDANT: No.

23

THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to you?

24

THE DEFENDANT: No, not [inaudible].

25

THE COURT: Thank you. If you feel like you
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

understand what you're doing and you want to do this today, I

2

will have you go ahead and sign that plea form.
Thank you. Mr. Arriaga-Luna, then to the charge of

3
4

murder, a first degree felony, how do you plead, guilty or not

5

guilty?

6

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

7

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I find that

8

Mr. Arriaga-Luna is competent to enter this plea, that he

9

understands the rights that he's giving up, he's had the

10

advantage of counsel, that it's a knowingly and voluntarily

11

plea. I will accept the plea and sign the plea form.

12

You have the right to be sentenced in no fewer than

13

two, nor more than 45 days from today. You have the right up

14

until the time of sentencing to request to withdraw this plea.

15

But the request has to be in writing and you would have to have

16

good cause. You would have to have a good reason not just that

17

you changed your mind.

18

What's anticipated with sentencing?

19

MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, we had discussed his

20

options. He would ask the court to sentence him today. He

21

understands that he is going to the Utah State Prison. He's

22

asking to start his time there. He also understands that by

23

being sentenced today he will be waiving an opportunity to file

24

a motion, withdraw his plea and understands so and is willing

25

to do so.
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

THE COURT: Is that is correct, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?

2

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

3

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

4

Does the state have any input?

5

MR. MATHIS: No, the state would go along with that

6

recommendation, Your Honor. This case has involved the murder

7

of an individual who was an illegal alien. To our knowledge in

8

speaking with the ME's office and law enforcement, there is no

9

known family members that are here. I believe that they are

10

still all in Mexico. And so as far as, like, representing to

11

the court anything from their side, I think that the crime

12

speaks for itself.

13

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Mr. Bautista?

14

MR. BAUTISTA: None, Your Honor. We would submit.

15

Anything else you want to tell me, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?

16

THE DEFENDANT: No, that's all.

17

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

18

It is the order of the court then that you serve a

19

prison term of 15 years to life at the Utah State Prison and I

20

will have you taken there forthwith.

21
22
23
24

MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, that's my only matter, may
I be excused?
THE COURT: Yes, thank you.
(End of Hearing.)

25
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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Addendum C
Mr. Arriaga’s affidavit (R. 1176–81)
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Addendum D
Docket in original case

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA
CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-203 - MURDER 1st Degree Felony
Offense Date: April 04, 2010
Plea: April 19, 2011 Guilty
Disposition: April 19, 2011 Guilty
Charge 2 - 76-10-503(2)(A) - POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY
RESTRICTED 2nd Degree Felony
Offense Date: April 04, 2010
Plea: August 09, 2010 Not Guilty
Disposition: April 19, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej)
Charge 3 - 76-8-306(1) - OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE 2nd Degree Felony
Offense Date: April 04, 2010
Plea: August 09, 2010 Not Guilty
Disposition: April 19, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej)
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
DIANNA GIBSON
PARTIES
Defendant - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA
Represented by: RUDY J BAUTISTA
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Also Known As - BEN ARRIAGA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)
Also Known As - BENJAMIN LUNA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)
Also Known As - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)
Also Known As - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA
Offense tracking number: 34332767
Date of Birth: August 29, 1972
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST JORDAN POLICE
LEA Case Number: 10H004593
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
Agency Case Number: 10011724
Sheriff Office Number: 244670
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
22.47
Amount Paid:
22.47
Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
2.47
Amount Paid:
2.47
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00

PROCEEDINGS
04-14-10 Judge STEPHEN ROTH assigned.
04-14-10 Case filed
04-14-10 Filed: From an Information
04-14-10 Filed: Information
04-14-10 Notice - WARRANT for Case 101400853 ID 12906534
04-14-10 Warrant ordered on: April 14, 2010 Warrant Num: 985195963 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
1000007.00
04-14-10 Warrant issued on: April 14, 2010 Warrant Num: 985195963 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
1000007.00
Judge: MARK KOURIS
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement
04-15-10 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on April 16, 2010 at 08:32 AM in
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.
04-16-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
Clerk:
salomet
Defendant Present
Interpreter: Patti McCoy (Spanish)
Language: Spanish
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Count: 9:00
INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense.
HEARING
COUNT: 9:00
Court orders bail to remain.
Hearing end 9:10 Courtroom 31
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints SL County Legal
Defender to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: SL County Legal Defender
City:
Phone:
Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
Instructions to the defendant:

1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed
counsel.
2. You are to cooperate with the appointed counsel in the defense
of this case.
3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an
address and a telephone number where you can be reached.
4. Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the
time of sentence.
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 04/26/2010
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 33
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: STEPHEN ROTH
04-16-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on April 26, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 33 with Judge ROTH.
04-16-10 ROLL CALL rescheduled on April 26, 2010 at 08:30 AM
Reason:.
04-16-10 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment of Legal Defender,
Signed by Judge M Kouris.
04-20-10 Filed: Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (Booking information)
04-26-10 Minute Entry - ROLL CALL continued
Judge:
MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
alysons
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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________________________________________________________________________________
Audio
Tape Number:
CR 33
Tape Count: 959
CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:
The Stipulation of counsel.
Continued as counsel has just received discovery.
The motion is granted.
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 05/24/2010
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 33
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
04-26-10 ROLL CALL Continued.
04-26-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on May 24, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ Courtroom
33 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
04-26-10 Filed: Appearance of counsel ATD Rudy Bautista
04-26-10 Filed: Formal request for discovery pursuant to rule 16 of the
rules of criminal procedure
04-26-10 Filed: Notice of bond hearing
04-26-10 Filed: Supplemental request for discovery
05-24-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge:
MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbiem
Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Interpreter: Patty McCoy (Spanish)
Language: Spanish
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
ct rm 33
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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________________________________________________________________________________
HEARING
TAPE: ct rm 33
COUNT: OTR
The spanish interpretor Patty came to me that the deft needs
continuance. She said deft was transported, and he's in cellroom.
Roll Call hrg continued.
ROLL CALL.
Date: 06/07/2010
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 33
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
05-24-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on June 07, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 33 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
05-27-10 Warrant recalled on: May 27, 2010 Warrant num: 985195963
Recall reason: Defendant was booked
06-07-10 Filed: Motion to withdraw as court-appointed counsel
06-07-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge:
MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbiem
Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
ct rm 33

Tape Count: OTR

HEARING
TAPE: ct rm 33
COUNT: OTR
The deft was transported from jail. On ATD's request, the
preliminary hrg set. He requested for 2 Spanish interpreter.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 07/21/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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________________________________________________________________________________
Location: WJ Courtroom 33
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: STEPHEN ROTH
06-07-10 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on July 21, 2010 at 01:30 PM in
WJ Courtroom 33 with Judge ROTH.
06-07-10 PRELIMINARY HEARING rescheduled on July 21, 2010 at 08:30 AM
Reason:.
06-15-10 Filed: Appearance of Counsel (ATD)
06-24-10 Filed: First Supplemental Request for Discovery
06-24-10 Filed: Demand that the State Produce the Preparers of All
Reports and Chain of Custody Witnesses at Trial.
07-21-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
alysons
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Interpreter: Pablo Silveira (Spanish), Randy Harrington (Spanish)
Language: Spanish
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
CR 33

Tape Count: 855-957

HEARING
This is time set for preliminary hearing. Susan Sprouse is present
as the court reporter. Neither party offers an opening statement.
The state calls James Bigelow and Brandon Turner. The witnesses are
sworn, testify and are cross examined.
The state offers exhibits 1, the medical examiner's report and 2,
certified copy of a prior conviction for the defendant. They are
received by the court. The state rests.
Counsel advises that the defendant elects not to testify on his
own behalf. The defense rests. The courts finds probable cause as
to all counts and binds the case over to the district court. Matter
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31
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________________________________________________________________________________
is set for arraignment.
The state moves to withdraw the exhibits. The court grants the
motion and they are returned to the state.
PRETRIAL/BO is scheduled.
Date: 08/09/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
07-21-10 PRETRIAL/BO scheduled on August 09, 2010 at 01:30 PM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
07-21-10 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned.
08-01-10 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 07-21-2010
08-02-10 Filed: Response to Request for Discovery, by Marc Mathis.
08-03-10 Filed: Transcript of Preliminary Hearing dated July 21, 2010.
08-09-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea
Judge:
ROBERT ADKINS
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MARTINEZ, ANDREA T
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 248

CHANGE OF PLEA
Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Change of Plea Note
Spanish Interpreter present.
08-09-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on September 07, 2010 at 01:30
PM in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
09-07-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
ROBERT ADKINS
PRESENT
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:32
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Clerk:
pamfw
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
Courtroom 36
HEARING
TAPE: Courtroom 36 Off the record, parties agree to reset the
Scheduling Conference.
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE.
Date: 09/20/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
09-07-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on September 20, 2010 at 01:30
PM in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
09-20-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
ROBERT ADKINS
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MITCHELL, JENNIFER C
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 146

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 10/04/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:32
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8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
09-21-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on October 04, 2010 at 01:30 PM
in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
10-04-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
ROBERT ADKINS
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C
Other Attorneys: JOEL J KITTRELL
Defendant Present
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 203

Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 11/01/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
10-05-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on November 01, 2010 at 01:30 PM
in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
11-01-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
ROBERT ADKINS
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:32
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Tape Number:
courtroom 36
Tape Count: 259
MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 12/20/2010
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
11-01-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on December 20, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
11-30-10 Filed: Motion and memorandum in support thereof to suppress
statements of defendant
Filed by: BAUTISTA, RUDY J
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.
12-17-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 101400853 ID 13464130
MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 1/27/2011
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING Modified.
12-17-10 Filed: Motion To Continue
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
12-17-10 Filed order: Order of Continuance
Judge ROBERT ADKINS
Signed December 17, 2010
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
12-22-10 Judge CHARLENE BARLOW assigned.
12-27-10 Filed: Notice of Motion Hearing, returned to sender for Rudy
Bautista
01-13-11 Filed: Affidavit re: Application for material witness warrant
and order
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:32
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01-13-11 Filed: Application for material witness warrant
01-13-11 Filed order: Material witness warrant
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
Signed January 11, 2011
01-13-11 Filed order: Order for material witness warrant
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
Signed January 11, 2011
01-27-11 Filed: Response to request for discovery
01-28-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 226

MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/09/2011
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW
01-28-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on February 09, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
02-04-11 Filed: Motion to continue
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
02-08-11 Filed order: Order of continuance
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
Signed February 08, 2011
02-09-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on March 10, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ
Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
02-09-11 Notice - NOTICE for Case 101400853 ID 13570716
MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:33
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Date: 03/10/2011
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW
02-18-11 Filed: Response To Defendant's Motion and Memorandum In Support
Thereof To Suppress Statements Of Defendant
03-10-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 413

HEARING
TAPE: courtroom 36
COUNT: 425
State's witness #1 Detective Brandon Turner, sworn and testified.
COUNT: 446
Mr. Mathis argues motion to suppress
COUNT: 509
Mr. Bautista argues motion to suppress
COUNT: 521
Mr. Mathis responds.
COUNT: 528
Mr. Bautista responds.
The Court takes the matter under advisement.
The State has until 3-15-11 to provide any supplemental briefing,
Mr. Bautista to respond by 3-18-11.
Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 03/24/2011
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:33
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Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW
03-10-11 Filed: Stipulated Statement of Facts submitted by Mr Marc C.S.
Mathis.
03-10-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on March 24, 2011 at 01:30 PM in
WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
03-24-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
PRESENT
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: NEILL, ROBERT G
Other Attorneys: JOEL J KITTRELL
Defendant Present
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 216

HEARING
TAPE: courtroom 36
COUNT: 216
Parties address the Court
The Court denies motion to suppress, the State to prepare the
Finding, Conclusion and Order.
Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 04/07/2011
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW
03-24-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 07, 2011 at 08:30 AM in
WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:33
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04-07-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
PRESENT
Clerk:
leahr
Prosecutor: NEILL, ROBERT G
Defendant Present
Interpreter: mccoy patty (Spanish)
Language: Spanish
Sheriff Office#: 244670
Audio
Tape Number:
courtroom 36

Tape Count: 11:11

HEARING
TAPE: courtroom 36
COUNT: 11:11
On Record, Defendant present, Patty Mccoy Spanish Interperter
present. On Defense counsels motion, court orders case set for a
Pre-Trial Conference.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
Date: 04/19/2011
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 36
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW
04-07-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 19, 2011 at 08:30 AM in
WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.
04-07-11 Filed order: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law. (Signed as
approved as to form by Rudy Bautista, and Marc C.S. Mathis)
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
Signed April 07, 2011
04-19-11 Filed: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
04-19-11 Filed: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and
Certificate of Counsel
04-19-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
PRESENT
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:34
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________________________________________________________________________________
Clerk:
mindeec
Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Audio
Tape Number:

courtroom 36

Tape Count: 1039

Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
BEN ARRIAGA
BENJAMIN LUNA
BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA
BENJAMIN ARRIAGA
Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present.
04-19-11 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
04-19-11 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed
04-19-11 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed
04-19-11 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified.
04-19-11 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is CHARLENE BARLOW
04-29-11 Note: Archived Physical File FP-0079
05-04-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
05-04-11 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
Note: Mail Payment;
12-12-11 Filed: Letter from Defendant
12-14-11 Note: Copies of letter given to the LDA's and DA's office.
06-18-12 Filed: Letter from the defendant
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:34
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07-13-12 Note: Copy of letter from Mr. Arriaga-Luna submitted to the DA
and LDA's office.
08-13-12 Filed: Motion for release of record and transcripts
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
08-13-12 Note: Paperwork to Judge for signature
08-14-12 Filed order: Order releasing record and transcripts
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
Signed August 14, 2012
08-15-12 Note: File mailed to: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTN:
MARK C. FIELD, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 160 EAST 300
SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR, PO BOX 140854, SALT LAKE CITY UT
84114-0854. Certified.
08-22-12 Filed: Certifide mail return receipt
09-17-12 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
09-17-12 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.47
09-17-12 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
09-17-12 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
2.47
09-18-12 Filed: Request for Recording-Bryan Stoddard
09-18-12 Note: CD mailed
11-26-12 Filed: Request for Recording-AG
11-26-12 Note: CD ready for pick up in Jury Room
12-31-12 Filed: Request for Recording-AG
12-31-12 Note: CD ready for pick up in Jury Room
09-16-13 Filed: Letter from Defendant
12-24-13 Filed: Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum
03-15-14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 04-19-2011
03-18-14 Filed: Received Transcript of Sentence, Judgment and
Commitment, dated 4/19/2011
04-30-14 Filed: Request fot Status
07-02-16 Judge HEATHER BRERETON assigned.
01-11-19 Judge DIANNA GIBSON assigned.

Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:34
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Filed August 23, 2018
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Charlene Barlow
No. 120404690
Emily Adams, Attorney for Appellant 1
Sean D. Reyes and Mark C. Field, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred. JUDGE JILL
M. POHLMAN concurred in part and concurred in the result in
part, with opinion.
1. Postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, and defendants
who bring such petitions do not have the right to appointed
counsel. See Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 1150.
But when Appellant filed his postconviction petition pro se, he
requested that counsel be appointed, and the district court
granted this request. If a petition is not summarily dismissed, the
court may appoint counsel “on a pro bono basis” to represent
the defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109(1) (LexisNexis
2012). We appreciate the district court’s decision to appoint
counsel in this case because it has helped us better understand
Appellant’s claims and arguments. And we appreciate the
willingness of appellate counsel, as well as that of James D.
Gilson, who represented Appellant below, to accept these
appointments.

Arriaga v. State
ORME, Judge:
¶1
Appellant Benjamin Arriaga (Defendant) appeals the
district court’s order granting the State’s summary judgment
motion and denying his petition for postconviction relief.
Defendant pled guilty to murder, a first degree felony, and was
sentenced to prison in 2011. He now challenges his guilty plea
on the grounds that it was not knowing or voluntary and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the
summary judgment denying his petition for postconviction
relief.
BACKGROUND
¶2
Defendant admitted to police that, on April 4, 2010, he
shot and killed the man (Victim) who was having an affair with
his wife. He explained that, having discovered the affair, he
angrily confronted Victim in a park. Defendant then pointed a
gun at Victim, intending to scare him into admitting to the affair.
When Victim admitted to sleeping with Defendant’s wife,
Defendant replied that “this kind of thing is not forgiven.”
Defendant said that Victim then lunged for the gun, and a
struggle ensued. Defendant told police that the gun discharged
several times in the course of the struggle, and Victim was shot
once in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the back, and once
in the back of the head.
¶3
The State charged Defendant with murder, a first degree
felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017);
the purchase, transfer, possession, or use of a firearm by a
restricted person, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-10-503(2)(a);
and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-8-
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306(3)(a). 2 Defendant entered into a plea bargain, agreeing to
plead guilty to murder if the other charges were dismissed. At
the plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged he knew that by
pleading guilty he was waiving his constitutional rights,
including the right to the presumption of innocence and the
right to a jury trial. 3 Defendant further acknowledged that he
understood everything that his counsel had discussed with him,
including the plea affidavit. The court then inquired whether
Defendant had any questions about the plea affidavit, to which
Defendant replied that he did not.
¶4
After trial counsel described the factual basis for
Defendant’s murder charge, Defendant made statements
implying that he acted in self-defense:
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on April 4th 2010
in Salt Lake County [Defendant] confronted a man
who had been sleeping with his wife. An argument
and subsequent fight took place at which time he
pulled out a firearm and he shot the man killing
him.
THE COURT: Is that what happened, [Defendant]?

2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant time
do not differ in any material way from those now in effect, we
cite the current version of the Utah Code for convenience.
3. Defendant’s primary language at the time of the plea hearing
was Spanish. To ensure Defendant understood the court
proceedings, interpreters were present and the plea affidavit was
written in both English and Spanish. However, an interpreter
was not present during out-of-court discussions between
Defendant and his trial counsel.
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THE DEFENDANT: I defended myself. It was not
my intention. I never thought about hurting him.
....
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we had—
discussed the imperfect self-defense concept and
that he did pull out a gun to get the man to confess
to sleeping with his wife. And that the man
charged at him but he was unarmed. So that is why
he used a gun.
THE COURT: I will find that that is a sufficient
factual basis.
THE DEFENDANT: He was drugged and drunk
and I didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife and
that’s why I—
After Defendant made these statements, the district court
clarified with Defendant that he intentionally killed Victim by
asking Defendant whether he knew that by pulling the trigger he
would cause Victim’s death. Defendant acknowledged that he
did. After entering his guilty plea, Defendant asked to be
sentenced immediately and waived the right to withdraw his
plea.
¶5
After a few months in prison, Defendant filed a petition
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78B-9-101 to -405 (LexisNexis 2012), arguing that his plea was
involuntary because his attorney explained his plea to him
without the assistance of an interpreter. He also raised an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on that same basis,
specifically arguing that counsel’s failure to use an interpreter
resulted in Defendant not knowing that he had a valid
self-defense argument and could have taken his case to trial. The
State filed a response to his petition, asserting that Defendant
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had not carried his burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and prejudicial. The State also contended that the nature of
Defendant’s plea was both voluntary and knowing because any
misunderstandings regarding his plea that arose out of his
communications with his attorney were cured by his plea
affidavit and plea colloquy, both of which had been translated
into Spanish.
¶6
An evidentiary hearing was held, but suspended, and in
the meantime, the State moved for summary judgment. Granting
the State’s motion, the district court concluded that Defendant
had failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and that all constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea
had been satisfied in Defendant’s case. Defendant appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7
Defendant contends that the district court erred in
granting the State’s motion for summary judgment for two
reasons. First, he argues that his plea was not knowing or
voluntary, asserting he did not understand the essential
elements of his murder charge at the time of his plea. Second, he
argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient for
failure to use an interpreter during their out-of-court
discussions.
¶8
“We review an appeal from an order dismissing or
denying a petition for postconviction relief for correctness
without deference to the lower court’s conclusions of law.”
Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 55, 234 P.3d 1115 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Similarly, we review a grant
of summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to
the lower court.” Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 345
(brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ANALYSIS
I. Defendant’s Plea
¶9
Defendant contends that his self-defense statements and
the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea demonstrate that
he did not understand the elements of the murder charge against
him, which rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary.4 For
a guilty plea to be valid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it must be made “voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). For that reason, “[i]t is the responsibility of the
district court to ensure that defendants enter pleas knowingly
and voluntarily.” State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 14, 309 P.3d
230. And rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides courts with a “roadmap for ensuring that defendants
receive adequate notice of their rights and for examining
defendants’ subjective understanding and intent.” Id.
¶10 Rule 11 states that a district court may not accept a guilty
plea until it has found that the defendant understands his
constitutional rights, including his right to the presumption of
innocence and his right to a jury trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3).
Additionally, the court must ensure that the defendant knows
4. The State argues that Defendant’s involuntary plea claim is
procedurally barred as Defendant did not raise it in a motion to
withdraw his plea before being sentenced. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-106(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017) (stating that a person is
ineligible for postconviction relief on any ground that “could
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal”). Defendant’s
argument is unsuccessful in this appeal, so we do not dwell on
whether it is also procedurally barred.
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“the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered.” Id. R. 11(e)(4)(A). It is not enough for the district court
to give notice to the defendant; the court must also find that “the
defendant actually understood the charges, the constitutional
rights, and the likely consequences of the plea and voluntarily
chose to plead guilty.” Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16 (emphasis
added).
¶11 Defendant asserts that he lacked a meaningful
understanding of the murder charge, and he points to his
self-defense statements during the plea colloquy to demonstrate
this lack of understanding. But the transcript of the plea colloquy
shows that any misunderstanding Defendant may have had was
inconsequential given his acknowledgements during the plea
colloquy that he understood the contents of his plea affidavit
and that he understood everything counsel had explained to
him.
¶12 Within the plea affidavit, prepared in both English and
Spanish, Defendant stated that the elements of the crime for
which he was pleading guilty were that “[Defendant] did
knowingly and intentionally cause[] the death of another.” He
also stated that the facts providing a basis for these elements
were that on April 4, 2010, he “confront[ed] a man who slept
[with his] wife” and “fought with the man and subsequently
shot him, killing him.” Based on Defendant’s assurances in the
plea colloquy that he had reviewed and understood his plea
affidavit, there is no doubt that Defendant understood the
elements of the murder charge at the time of his guilty plea.
¶13 Defendant also argues that his self-defense claims
“negated an essential element of the murder charge and
provided objective evidence that he did not understand the
proceedings.” When a defendant puts an affirmative defense at
issue during trial, “the State carries the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including
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the absence of an affirmative defense[.]” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,
¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, a “necessary element of a murder
conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses.” Id. When
Defendant made his statements indicating that he acted in selfdefense, his trial counsel explained to the court that the concept
of imperfect self-defense had been explained to Defendant,
specifically in relation to the facts of his case, including counsel’s
assessment that it was not a viable defense. 5 And “[w]here a
defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court
usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant
has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545
5. Imperfect self-defense “is an affirmative defense to a charge of
murder” in cases where “the defendant caused the death of
another . . . under a reasonable belief that the circumstances
provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although
the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a)
(LexisNexis 2017). And so the “difference between perfect
self-defense and imperfect self-defense is the determination of
whether the defendant’s conduct was, in fact, legally justifiable
or excusable under the existing circumstances.” State v. Low, 2008
UT 58, ¶ 32, 192 P.3d 867 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2017)
(providing that, in cases of perfect self-defense, lethal force is
justified “only if the person reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury . . . as a result
of another person’s imminent use of unlawful force”). But the
use of lethal force is not justified when the defendant “initially
provokes the use of force against the person with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant”
or when the defendant “was the aggressor” and did not
withdraw from the encounter. Id. § 76-2-402(2)(a)(i), (iii).
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U.S. 175, 183 (2005). Trial counsel assured the district court that
the concept of imperfect self-defense had been explained to
Defendant, and where Defendant had previously told the court
he understood everything counsel had explained to him, it was
reasonable for the court to conclude that Defendant understood
how the imperfect self-defense theory applied in his case.
Furthermore, with the benefit of an interpreter during the plea
colloquy, Defendant made no objection to trial counsel’s
assurance that Defendant understood.
¶14 We do, however, recognize that Defendant’s statements
suggesting possible self-defense did raise a question of whether
he intended to kill Victim because he stated, “It was not my
intention. I never thought about hurting him.” It was therefore
necessary for the court to address the conflict between this
statement and his plea affidavit. See State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d
216, 217 (Utah 1991) (“‘Any omissions or ambiguities in the
affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy.’”)
(quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
And the court did address this conflict by asking Defendant
whether he knew that his actions, specifically pulling the trigger
of the gun, would cause Victim’s death. Defendant
acknowledged that he did.
¶15 Defendant further contends that he did not understand
his guilty plea because he “speaks Spanish, has a fifth-grade
education, and did not speak English except a few random
words at the time he pleaded guilty,” while “[h]is trial counsel
did not speak Spanish.” He additionally claims not to have read
the plea affidavit before signing it. But these claims contradict
Defendant’s statements to the district court during his plea
hearing. Defendant is bound by his statements because “the
representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor
at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge
accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any
20150911-CA
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subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open
court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). “Accordingly, the truth and accuracy of
a defendant’s statements during the [plea colloquy] should be
regarded as conclusive in the absence of a believable, valid
reason justifying a departure from the apparent truth of his [plea
colloquy] statements.” United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1205
(10th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no valid reason to doubt the truthfulness of
Defendant’s statements to the district court during his plea
colloquy because an interpreter was present and Defendant
professed to understand everything discussed with counsel and
the contents of his plea affidavit. Because there is nothing in the
record that suggests Defendant lacked an understanding of the
elements of the murder charge against him or anything but his
own later assertions that he did not actually understand the
essence of imperfect self-defense, the district court did not err in
concluding on summary judgment that his plea was voluntarily
and knowingly made.
II. Assistance of Counsel
¶16 Defendant contends that his trial counsel’s performance
was deficient because no interpreter was present during their
out-of-court discussions prior to his plea hearing. To prevail on
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
show that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient in that it ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness’” and
(2) “counsel’s performance was prejudicial in that ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 87, 150 P.3d 480 (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
¶17 Defendant must first show that “counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland,
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466 U.S. at 688. Defendant asserts that the language barrier with
his trial counsel prevented him from becoming aware of his right
to the presumption of innocence and his right to plead not
guilty. He claims that his counsel’s conduct fell below the
standard of reasonableness when he did not secure an
interpreter to better communicate these rights to Defendant.
Nevertheless, any “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance
must be highly deferential” and “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. And whether
counsel’s conduct was reasonable “may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or
actions.” Id. at 691.
¶18 Here, Defendant claims that he only knew a few words of
English at the time of his plea hearing and that trial counsel did
not speak Spanish. But with an interpreter present, Defendant
never advised the court that there was any issue in
communicating with his counsel. He specifically acknowledged
in the plea colloquy, during which an interpreter was present,
that he understood everything counsel had explained to him.
Had there been an insurmountable language barrier, Defendant
had the opportunity to raise this issue with the court in the plea
hearing on several occasions when asked by the court whether
he understood everything his counsel had discussed with him
and whether he had questions about the plea affidavit. We
therefore are not persuaded that trial counsel acted
unreasonably in failing to secure an interpreter for his
out-of-court consultations with Defendant.
¶19 We do appreciate the importance of interpreters, but any
suggestion that we should err on the side of requiring an
interpreter in this case is dispelled by the other basis on which
Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim can be rejected.
Defendant does nothing to establish that counsel’s failure to
secure an interpreter was prejudicial. To contest his guilty plea
20150911-CA
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on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would
have been rational under the circumstances.” Rippey v. State,
2014 UT App 240, ¶ 14, 337 P.3d 1071 (emphasis in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant must
do more than allege that he would not have pled guilty had his
counsel secured an interpreter for their out-of-court discussions.
Rather, we “look to the factual circumstances surrounding the
plea” and whether it would have been rational for Defendant to
reject the plea and insist on a trial. Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶20 At the time of the State’s plea offer, Defendant had
already confessed to killing Victim, and a motion to suppress
that confession had been denied by the district court. Defendant
asserts that, had trial counsel better explained the elements of
murder to Defendant, he would have known he had a valid
claim for imperfect self-defense based on his statement to
officers that Victim lunged at him during the confrontation. But
the imperfect-self-defense theory is substantially undermined by
the fact that, in what Defendant characterized as a tussle over the
gun that he brought only to scare Victim, Victim was shot five
times, including twice in the back and once in the back of the
head. Based on these circumstances, there is nothing to suggest
that it would have been rational for Defendant to reject the
State’s offer to dismiss the other two felony charges against him
in exchange for his guilty plea to the murder charge.
CONCLUSION
¶21 Defendant’s statements and actions do not demonstrate
that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary or that his
counsel performed deficiently by not having an interpreter

20150911-CA

12

2018 UT App 160

Arriaga v. State
present during their out-of-court discussions. Additionally, he
fails to establish any prejudice as a result of this decision by
counsel. We thus presume Defendant’s counsel rendered
constitutionally adequate assistance, exercising reasonable
professional judgment, and the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the State. Accordingly, we
affirm.

POHLMAN, Judge (concurring in part and concurring in the
result in part):
¶22 I concur with the lead opinion except as to Part I, in which
I concur in the result. I am troubled by my colleagues’
conclusion that the district court adequately remedied the
conflict between the statements in Defendant’s plea affidavit and
his self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy. See supra
¶ 14. Defendant interjected statements that created a conflict
about the nature of his plea. In my view, it is questionable
whether the court’s attempts to resolve the conflict were
successful.
¶23 The court apparently recognized the significance of
Defendant’s initial assertion that he “defended [him]self,” and it
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between his plea
affidavit and that assertion by asking defense counsel if it
changed the plea. But although counsel explained that he had
“discussed the imperfect self-defense concept” with Defendant,
he did not explain what Defendant understood. Thus, counsel’s
representation did not resolve the conflict or demonstrate that
Defendant understood he was waiving any potential defenses in
pleading guilty to first degree murder.
¶24 Defendant further added to the confusion when he
interjected that he shot Victim because “[Victim] was drugged
and drunk and [Defendant] didn’t know if [Victim] had a
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weapon.” The court again tried to resolve the conflict, this time
asking Defendant whether he knew that his actions would cause
Victim’s death. Defendant acknowledged that he knew “by
pulling the trigger” of the gun he could cause Victim’s death, but
that acknowledgement did not speak to the conflict created by
his assertions: whether he understood that in pleading guilty to
first degree murder he was conceding that the concept of
imperfect self-defense did not apply.
¶25 Thus, I question whether the ambiguities introduced in
the plea hearing regarding the nature of Defendant’s plea were
resolved by the court’s colloquy. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App
212, ¶ 16, 73 P.3d 985 (recognizing the district court’s obligation
to clarify discrepancies during the plea colloquy). However, I
concur in the result and would affirm the district court’s decision
based on Defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice.
¶26 Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, “[t]he court
may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the
petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the
post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts
introduced at trial or during sentencing.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-104(2) (LexisNexis 2012); see also Gardner v. State, 2010 UT
46, ¶ 62, 234 P.3d 1115. A petitioner must satisfy the same
standard to obtain relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Landry v. State, 2016 UT App 164, ¶ 23 n.6,
380 P.3d 25.
¶27 On appeal, Defendant relies on the same arguments to
satisfy this standard for his claims based on the voluntariness of
his plea and his claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
In addressing Defendant’s challenge based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, we conclude that he failed to demonstrate
that, absent the claimed errors, he would have rejected the
State’s plea offer and that it would have been rational under the
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circumstances to do so. See supra ¶¶ 19–20; see also Rippey v. State,
2014 UT App 240, ¶ 14, 337 P.3d 1071 (requiring a petitioner
challenging the voluntariness of his plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel to “show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that
such a decision would have been rational under the
circumstances” (quotation simplified)). I believe this deficiency
is equally fatal to Defendant’s challenge based on the voluntary
nature of his plea. For the same reasons he fails to demonstrate
prejudice arising out of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice arising out of his
claim based on the voluntariness of his plea. See supra ¶¶ 19–20.
On this basis, I would affirm the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment to the State on Defendant’s
postconviction challenge to the voluntariness of his plea.
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Addendum F
Plea affidavit (R. 79–89)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU RT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTR!TO
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
ESTADO DE UTAH

Plaintiff,

vs

Deman dante

ie.~..,n~~

-\.e:i""'
~,i;~
Defetlant
Acusad o.

STATEMENT OF DEFE NDAN T
IN SUPPORT OF GUil TY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF
COUNSEL
AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO
EN APOYO A SU DECLARACION
DE CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO
DEL ASESOR LEGAL

Case No.
No. de caso.

/o/~ oo~f )

--------

~,, \c.- s- - Lv......, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
~I,
advised of .and that I und~rstand the following facts and rights:
y certifico que
Y o , - - - - - - - - - ~ par media de la sig.uiente reconozco
s:
derecho
y
hechos
tes
siguien
he sido asesorado y que entiendo los

Notific ation of Charges
Notifica ci6n de Cargos

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:

Me declaro culpable (o sin argumento) de los siguientes delitos:
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'··

Crime & Statut ory
Provis ion

Delito y provisi ones estatut arias

A.

Degree

Punish ment
Min/M ax and / or
Minimum Manda tory

Grado

Pena Min/Max y/o
Minimo Mandatorio

I =>

B.

C.

D.

read it,
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information agains t me. I have
crime(s) to which
or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elemen ts of
I am pleading guilty (or no contest).
Lo he leido,
He recibido una copia (reformada) del Documento acusatorio en mi contra.
cual(es)
(las)
el
por
)
delito(s
del(os)
tos
o me lo han lei do y entiendo la naturaleza y los. elemen
me declar.o culpable (o sin argumento).

0080

'··

(or no conte st) are:
The eleme nts of the crime (s) to which I am pleading guilty
o culpable (o sin.
Los elementos del (los) delito(s) por el (Jos) cual(es) me declar
·
argumento) son:

that ·1 comm itted the crime s
I under stand that by plead ing guilty I will be admitting
contesting that I comm itted the
listed above . (Or, if I am plead ing no contest, I am not
ing no conte st, I do not dispu te
foreg oing crimes). I stipul ate and agree (or, if I am plead
ct and the cond uct of other
or contest) that the follow ing facts describe my condu
e a basis for the court to
perso ns for which I am crimin ally liable. Thes e facts provid
nts of the crime (s) to which I
accep t my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the eleme
am plead ing guilty (or no contest):
comet! el delito (los delitos)
Entiendo que al declararme culpable estare admitiendo que
ento, no disputare que comet[ los
mencionado(s) anteriormente. (0, si me declaro sin argum
me declaro sin argumento, no
si
delitos que anteceden). Yo estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o
cta y la conducta de otras
disputo ni refute) que los siguientes hechos describen mi condu
hechos proveen las bases para
personas por las cuales soy responsable legalmente. Estos
argumento) y comprueba los
que el tribunal acepte mi declaraci6n de culpabilidad (o sin
estoy declarando culpable (o sin
elementos del delito (los delitos) por el cual (los cuales) me
argumento):

1...---.. :_

'

.
i

k\\:_7

k,·,..,., .

Waiver of Constrtutional Rights
Renuncia de ios derechos constitucionales

I have the follow ing
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that
States. I also under stand that
rights unde r the const itution s of Utah and of the United
rights:
if I plead guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following
los siguientes derechos
Doy esta declaraci6n voluntariamente. Entiendo que tengo
ien entiendo que si me declaro
bajo la constituci6n de Utah y de los Estados Unidos. Tamb
os
culpable (o sin argumento) renunciare a los siguientes derech
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,:

.

..

. ·•

attorn ey and that if
Counsel: I ·know that I have the right to be represented by an
at no cost to me. I
I canno t afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court
able, be required to pay
was
l
under stand that I might later, if the judge determined that
for the appointed lawye r's service to me.
por un abogado y que si
Asesoramiento: Se que tengo el derecho de ser representado
l sin costo alguno para
tribuna
del
no puedo costear uno, se me asignara un abogado por parte
te se me requerira
solven
soy
mi. Entiendo que posteriormente, si el juez determinara que
pagar por los servicios de! abogado que me tue asignado.
d my right to
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waive
for the follow ing
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
reasons:
he renunciado a mi
He (no he) renunciado a mi derecho de asesora miento legal. Si
nte y voluntariamente
derecho de asesoramiento legal, lo he hecho a sabiendas, intelige
por las siguientes razones:

this statem ent
If I have waive d my rights to counsel, I certify that I have read
to which I
crimes
s and
and that I under stand the nature and elements of the charge
in this case and other
am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand my rights
).
cases and the conse quenc es of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s
o que he lef do esta
Si yo he renunciado a mi derecho de asesoramiento legal, certific
y de!itos por los cuales ·
afirmaci6n y que entiendo la naturaleza·y los elementos de los cargos
o-s en este caso y otros
me declaro culpable (o sin argumento). Tambien entiendo mis derech
cases y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad
If I have no waived my right to counsel, my attorn ey is
discussed this statem ent, my
• My attorn ey and I have fully
\, e <./
v
).
. rights, a d the conse quenc es of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s
do es
aboga
mi
legal,
ia
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho de asesor
de esta afirmaci6n, mis
fondo
a
do
platica
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . Mi abogado y yo hemes
(o sin argumento)
ilidad
derechos y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de cuipab
by an impar tial
Jury Trial: I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial

ng guilty (or no contes t).
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleadi
demora ante un
Juicio por jurado. Se que tengo el derecho a un juicio pubiico y sin
o al declararme culpable
jurado imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que estare renunciando a ese derech
(o sin argumento).
that if I were to
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses: I know
testifie d
a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnes ses who
have a trial,
would
ey,
attorn
an
to
agains t me and b) my attorney, or mysel f if I waived my right
testifie d agains t me.
have the oppor tunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who
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si tuviera un jLiicio, a) Tendr ia
Careo y contra interr ogato rio de los testig os. Se que
en mi contra y b) mi aboga do, o yo
el derec ho de very observar a los testigos que testifiquen
nidad de contra interro gar a todos
si renunciara a mi derecho de abogado, tendrf an la oportu
·
las testigos que testifiquen en mi contra.

a trial, I could call
Right to compel witnesses: I know that if I were to have

requiring the
witnesses if I chose to, .and I would be able to obtain subpoenas
to pay for the
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.

podr[a elegir Hamar a
Derecho de obligar a testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio,
onio de esos
testim
y
asistencia
testigos, y podria obtener comparendos requiriendo la
el Estado cubrir[a las costas.
testigos. Si no pudiera costear el pago de las testigas,

n: I know that if I were
Righ t to testify and pr;vilege again st self-incriminatio

f. I also know that if I
to have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behal
give evidence against
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me
be told that they could
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would
not hold my refusal to testify against me.
inaci6 n. Se que si
Derecho a testifi car y el priviiegio en contra de la auto- incrim
no

se

que si
a mi favor. Tamb ien
tuviera un juicio, yo tendri a el derecho de dar testimonio
contra de
en
as
prueb
ntar
prese
o
onio
desea ra testificar, nadie podri a obligarme a dar testim
que no
rla
indica
le
se
jurado
al
mi mismo. Tambien se que si yo eligiera no dar testimonio,
podrla n usar mi decision en mi contra.

that if I do not plead
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof: l know

proves that I am guilty of
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State
me, I need only plead
the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against
would have the
State
"not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the
nable doubt. If the
burden of proving each element of the charges(s) beyond a reaso
that each juror would
trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning
·
have to find me guilty.
decla re
me
no
si
que
·se
a.
prueb
de
Presunci6n de inocencia y responsabilidad

te hasta que la fiscall a comp ruebe que
culpable (o sin argumento), se me presume ser inocen
las cargos en rni contra, solo
soy culpable del (las) delito(s) imputado(s). Si elijo pelear
para juicio. En el juicio, la fiscali a
necesito declararme "no culpable," y mi caso sera fijado
elementos del (los) cargo(s) mas alla
tendri a la responsabilidad de comprobar cada uno de las
el veredicto deber a ser unani me,
de una duda razonable. Si el juicio fuera ante un jurado,
trarme culpable
encon
quiere decir que cada miembro del jurado tendra que

presumption of_
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the
.
above
stated
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s)
nci6n de
renuncio a fa presu
Entiendo que si me declaro culpable (o sin argumento),
mencionado(s).
inocencia y admitire que comet[ el (los) de[ito(s) previamente
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n, if I were convicted by a jury or
Appeal: I know that under the Utah Constitutio
iction and sentence. If I could not
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conv
those costs for me. I understand
afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay
if I plead guilty (or no contest). I
that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction
I must file a notice of appeal within 30
understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence
days after my sentence is entered.
si fuera cond enad o por un jurad o o
Apelaci6n. Se que bajo la Constituci6n de Utah,
y sentencia. Si no pudiera costear las costa s de
juez, tendd a el derecho de apelar mi condena
ndo que al declararme culpable (o sin
la apelaci6n, el Estado cubriria esas costas. Entie
condena. Entiendo que si deseo apela r mi
argumento) renuncio a mi derecho de apelar mi
ci6n dentro de treinta dias despues de
sentencia debo presentar notificaci6n de mi apela
asentada mi sentencia

I am waiv ing and givin g up
l know and understand that by pleading guilty,

explained abov e.
.all the statutory and constitutional rights as
y cedo todo s mis dere chos
Se y entiendo que al declararme culpable, renuncio
explicados.
estatutarios y constitucionales previamente

test) Plea
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or ·No Con
sin argu men to)
(o
dad
abiii
culp
Consecuencias de dar una declaraci6n de

nce that may be imposed for
Potential penalties: 1know the maximum sente
contest). I know that by pleading guilty
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no
ry penalty, I will be subjecting mys elf
(or no contest) to a crime that carries a mandato
know my sentence may include a
to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I
prison term, fine, or both.
podria impo ner por cada delito del
Penas potenciales. Se la pena maxima que se
ento). Se que al decla rarm e culpable (o sin
cual me estoy declarando culpable (o sin argum
pena obligatoria, me estar e sujetando a servir
argumento) de un delito que lleve consigo una
ncia puede incluir un termino en la prisi6n,
la pena obligatoria por ese delito. Se que mi sente
una multa o ambos

(90%) surcharge will be
I know that in addition to a fine, an ninety percent
make restitution to any victim(s) of my
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to
on charges that are dismissed as
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed
part of a plea agreement.

nta por ciento (90%) en recargos.
Se que aunado a una multa, se impondra un nove
a cualquier victima de mis delitos, incluyendo
Tambien se que se me podria ordenar reintegrar
stimados como parte de! trato declaratorio.
reintegro que se deba por cargos que sean dese
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...

e is more than one
Cons ecuti ve/co ncurr ent prison terms: I know that if-ther
another (cons ecutiv ely), or
crime involved, the sente nces may be imposed one after
I may be charg ed an
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that
that if I am on proba tion or
additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know
I have been convi cted or
parole, or awaiting sente ncing on anoth er offense of which
contest) plea·(s) now may
which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no
If the offen se to which I am
result in consecutive sente nces being imposed on me.
on parole, I know the law
now plead ing guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or
s the court finds and state s
requires the court to impos e consecutive sentences unles
ropriate.
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inapp
que si hubiera mas de-un delito
Se
os.
Term inos de prisi6n consecutivos/simultane
la
de otra (consecutivamente), o
involucrado, las penas podrian ser impuestas una despues
que se me podria cobrar una
podrian ser servidas al mismo tiempo, (simultaneamente). Se
aci6n. Tambien se que si estoy
multa adicional par cada delito por el cual haya dado mi declar
recibir sentencia por algun otro
bajo libertad provisional o preparatoria, 6 si estoy esperando
culpable (o sin argumento), mi(s)
delito por el cual haya sido condenado o me haya declarado
podrian resuftar en fa
ahora
doy
que
declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento)
estoy declarando culpable
me
cual
el
imposici6n de sentencias consecutivas. Si el delito por
se que la ley requiere que
,
sucedi6 cuando me encontraba preso o bajo libertad preparatoria
al
tribun falle y haga -constar en el
el tribunal imponga sentencias consecutivas a menos que el
acta que las sentencias consecutivas serian inapropiadas.
) (is/ar e not) the result
Plea agreement: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are
attorney. All the prom ises,
of a plea agree ment betwe en myse lf and the prosecuting
fully conta ined in this
duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are
statement, including those explained below:
ilidad (o sin argumento) es (son) el
· Trato declaratorio. Mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpab
do fiscal. Todas las promesas,
resuftado de un. trato declaratorio que he hecho con el aboga
alguno, se encuentran en su
deberes y provisiones de este trato declaratorio, si hubiera
a continuaci6n:
totalidad en esta afirmaci6n, incluyendo aquellas explicadas

ncing conce ssion or
Trial judge not boun d: I know that any charge or sente
including a reduc tion of the
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence,
se couns el or the prose cuting
charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defen
opinio ns they expre ss to
any
attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that
g on the judge .
me as to what they believe the judge may do are not bindin
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cualquier cargo, o concesi6n
El juez de prime ra instan cia no esta obliga do. Se que
suspendida, incluyendo
cia
senten
de sentencia o recomendaci6n de libertad condicional, o
sido hecho o solicitado
haya
cia, que
una reducci6n de los cargos para el dictado de la senten
el
torias para juez. Tamb ien se que
ya sea por el abogado de defensa o el fiscal no son obliga
se piensa que el juez pueda hacer no
cualquier idea expresada ante mi concerniente a lo que
son obligatorias para el juez.

Unite d States citizen,
Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a
unde r United States
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation
affect my immigration status,
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely
the United States. I
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into
plea on my immigration
understand that if I have questions about the effect of my
status, I should consult with an immigration attorney.
s,
ano de los Estado Unido
inmigraci6n/Deportaci6n: Entiendo que si no soy ciudad
me sujetara a deportaci6n bajo las
mi(s) declaraci6n(es) del d[a de hoy podria, o ciertamente
s, o de otra mane ra afectaran
!eyes y reglamentos de inmigraci6n de los Estado Unido
impedir mi reingreso a los Estad os
negativamente mi estado migratorio, que podria incluir el
que tendra mi declaraci6n de
Unidos. Entiendo que si tengo preguntas acerca del efecto
abogado de emigraci6n.
un
culpabiiidad en mi estado migratorio, debo consulter con

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
Certificaci6n de voluntariedad .del acusa do

, threats or
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force
(or no
guilty
plead
to
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me

ent have been made to
contest). No promises except those contained in this statem
me.
han utilizado fuerza
ad. No se
Estoy dando esta declaraci6n par mi propia y libre volunt
e de declararme culpable (o sin
rii amenazas o coacci6n de ningun tipo para convencerm
ci6n de aquellas que se
argumento). Nose me ha hecho ninguna promesa con excep
encuentran en esta afirmaci6n.

my attorney, and I
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by
my own. I know that I am
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as
ent, but I do not wish to
free to change or delete anything contained in this statem
t.
make any changes because all of the statements are correc

do sus contenidos y
He le[do esta afirmaci6n, o me la ha leido mi abogado, entien
libre de camb iar o borrar
soy
que
Se
.
adopto cada afirmaci6n aqui contenida como mia propia
ningun cambio
hacer
deseo
cualquier afirmaci6n contenida en este documento pero no
porque todas las afirmaciones en este son correctas.

I am satisfied with advice and assistance of my attorney.

abogado(a).
Estoy satisfecho(a) con el asesoramiento y servicio de mi
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grade. I
the
through
school
d
attende
have
I
age.
of
years
- --- - I am
English, an
can read and understand the English language. If I do not unders tand
of any drugs,
interpr eter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence
d to plead decide
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgme nt when I
or intoxic ants
guilty. I am not presen tly under the influence of any drug, medica tion,
which impair my judgment.
anos de edad. · He asistido hasta el __ grado escolar. Puedo leer y
Tengo _
un interprete. No
entender el idioma ingles. Si no entiendo el ingles, se me ha proporcionado
gante que
me encontraba bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente, medicina, o embria
to no me
momen
este
En
.
culpable
rme
declara
decidi
pudiera impedir mi sano juicio cuando
pueda
que
gante
embria
o
a,
medicin
,
encuentro bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente
impedir mi sano juicio.

L

0

1~

le
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mental ly capab

l am free of
of unders tanding these procee dings and the consequences of my plea.
tandin g
unders
any mental disease, defect, or impairm ent that would preven t me from
g my plea.
what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enterin
imiento y las
proced
este
r
entende
y
ir
Me considero de mente sana, capaz de discern
.o
defecto
,
mental
dad
enferme
r
consecuencias de mi declaraci6n. Estoy libre de cualquie
ci6n
declara
mi
de
que
impedimenta que me evite entender lo que estoy hacienda o que evite
a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente.

), I
I understand that if I want to withdr aw my guilty (or no contes t) plea{s
nced.
annou
must file a written motion to withdr aw my plea{s) before senten ce is
the plea
from
aw
withdr
to
I unders tand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion
I will
t.
agreem ent must be made within 30 days of pleading ·guilty or no contes
and
only be allowed to withdr aw my plea if I show that it was not knowi ngly
after
volunt arily made. I unders tand that any challenge to my plea(s) made
in Title 78,
Act
dies
Reme
ion
senten cing must be pursue d under the Post-Convict
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(o sin
Entien do que si quisier a retirar mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpab ilidad
s) antes
aci6n(e
cieclar
argume nto), debo presen tar una petici6 n escrita para retirar mi(s)
la
so,
suspen
que se pronun cie la sentencia. Entiend o que para una Declaraci6n en
de treinta dias de
petici6 n para retirarme del trato declara torio debe ser hecha dentro
ira retirar mi
permit
me
se
nte
mi declara ci6n de culpab ilidad o sin argumento. So!ame
y
das
declara ci6n de culpab ilidad si demue stro que no fue dada a sabien
de culpab ilidad
volunta riamen te. Entiendo que para disputa r mi(s) declaraci6n(es)
ios Postdespue s de recibid a ta senten cia debere hacerlo bajo la Ley de Remed
Proced imiento
del
Reglas
las
del
conden atorios Titulo 78, Capitu lo 35a, y la Regla 65C

Penal de Utah.
Dated this

\1

"-or:\

d ay of --~+\-'-'.-,_ _ _ , 201L.

Fechado este d1a

0087

..·'

. ,,.

Certificate of Defense Attorney
Certificado del abogado defensor

, the
~- :t?\c\ ~.... - ~11,-.."
I certify that I am the attorn.ey for
read it
have
defendan t above, and that I know he/she has read thesttem ent or that I
to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understa nds
the meaning of its contents and is mentaHy and physically competent. To the best of
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the element s of the
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarati ons made by the
defendan t in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

Certifico que soy el abogado de _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , el acusado
a
previamente mencionado, y que se que el/ella ha leido la afirmaci6n o que yo se la he leido
entiende
fella
el/ella; He hablado con el/ella de esta afirmaci6n y me parece que el
completamente el significado de su contenido yes competente fisica y mentalmente. A mi leal
la
saber y entender, despues de una investigaci6n apropiada, los elementos del(los) delito(s) y
sinopsis de los hechos de la conducta penada del acusado son correctos; Esto, junta con los
en el afidavit previo son correctos y
otros comentarios y aseveraciones hechos por el acusa
verdaderos.

A

NEY FOR DEFEND ANT

Bar
ABOGADO DEL ACUSAD O
No. del colegio de abogados _ _ __

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
Certificado del abogado fiscal

~.

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
\......i_~ defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defenda nt and
~S ~ \
0

t,,-

find that theactu al basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) ·is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to
encourage a plea has been offered to defendant. The plea negotiati ons are fully
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplem ented
on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the
plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.
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en el caso en contra de/
Certifico que soy el abogado representando al Estado de Utah
ci6n del acusad o y
Afirma
do esta
acusado _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . He repasa
del acusad o constit uyen el
encuentro que los hecha s en las que se basa la conducta penal
o ningun incentivo, amena za
delito y son verdad eros y correctos. No se ha ofrecido al acusad
s para la declar aci6n se
o intimidaci6n para alenta r su declaraci6n. Las negociacione
tario adjunta, se han
declara
Trato
el
encuentran en su totalid ad en esta afirmaci6n yen
creer que la eviden cia
para
bles
suplem entado en el acta ante el tribunal. Hay causas razona
(cuale s) da su(s)
ual
(las)
el
respaldara la conde na del acusado par el (los) delito(s) par
es del publico.
interes
·
servir
dec1araci6n(es) y que la aceptaci6n de la(s) declar, ci6n(es)

PROSE~UT)JiG ATTORNEY
Bar No./ll'f'6

ABOGAD_O__,F-1S-C-AL
No. del colegio de aboga das _ _ __

Order
Orden

certifications of
Based on the facts set forth 1n the foregoing Statement and the
ns in court, the Court
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representatio
st) plea(s) is/are
conte
no
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's guilty (or
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

aci6n del(a) acusad o(a)
Basado en los hechos previamente presentadas yen la certific
l, el juez coma testigo
tribuna
el
y su asesor juridico , y basado en las afirmaciones dadas ante
sin argum ento) del acusa do ha
de las firmas falla que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o
(han) sido dada(s) libre, a sabiendas y voluntariamente

t) plea(s) to
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contes
the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
ilidad (o sin
POR LO TANTO SE ORDENA que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpab
da.
asenta
y
da
acepta
sea
ci6n,
argumento) del acusad o presentada en esta Afirma

Dated this

}'111- day of

4 r.,.. ;l

' 2 0J.L...

~
Fechado este dia _ _ de _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ d
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